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Introduction 
The disinterest of the British people towards empire is a phenomenon that has long been observed 
by historians; as early as 1906, John Seeley wrote that there was ‘something very characteristic in 
the indifference which we show towards this mighty phenomenon of the diffusion of our race and 
the expansion of our state. We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a 
fit of absence of mind.’1 Historical consensus indicates that popular British indifference towards 
empire continued throughout the life of the British Empire, through to its dismantling in the 
twentieth century. Historians such as John Darwin, Robert James, and Bernard Porter largely accept 
that the majority of Britons, from working men and women to political elites, had more pressing 
problems particularly in the post-war era, and that decolonisation was quickly and painlessly 
processed as a pragmatic necessity.2 This paper, however, seeks to explore the extent to which 
Britons struggled to come to terms with the new post-colonial order, as reflected in British politics. 
While historical reality showed that there were indeed few that sought to hold onto empire when it 
was clear that economic, moral and international pressures would make it near impossible to do so, 
it would be naïve to presume that the breakdown of an institution that had occupied British elites 
since the seventeenth century had no significant impact at all on British politics. Through an analysis 
of the activity and rhetoric of prominent right-wing individuals, namely John Tyndall, A. K. 
Chesterton and John Enoch Powell, along with the Monday Club and the Conservative Party at large, 
this paper seeks to show how political resistance to the post-colonial order was articulated in Britain. 
By evaluating contemporary newspapers and parliamentary records, this paper explores the extent 
to which the Right’s outward expression of discomfort reflected a wider British inability to come to 
terms with a post-imperial Britain.  
This study will direct its analysis on the right-wing of British politics between 1960-1973; this focus 
was selected because the Right traditionally represented the imperialist wing of British politics and 
was therefore more inclined than the Left to show resistance to the consequences of decolonisation. 
However, in the mid-nineteenth century, the British Left was far from anti-militarist or anti-
imperialist, therefore the Left should not be neglected from a discussion on Britain’s adjustment to a 
post-colonial world; this study must therefore be seen as a contribution to a wider debate on British 
internal decolonisation that encompasses the whole spectrum of British politics and society. On the 
left wing of British politics, there is much scope for research, for example, on the British New Left 
movement from the 1960s, working-class nationalism, and imperialist wars conducted by Labour 
                                                          
1 Seeley, The Expansion of England, 10. 
2 See: Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation; James, ‘The Conservative Party and the Empire’; Porter, The Lion’s 
Share. 
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governments. This paper, however, will focus on the right wing of British politics, or the British Right, 
which in this case refers to the Conservative Party and all groups and individuals that sat further 
right of official party policy.  
The Right, however, encompassed a wide spectrum of groups and individuals, therefore some 
attempt will be made to distinguish between the ‘moderate right’ and the ‘far right’. The term ‘far 
right’ was particularly difficult to objectively apply between 1960-1975; as the anti-colonial lobby 
grew increasingly vocal over immoral policy, and Conservative Party leadership moved gradually 
towards centrist policies, many Conservative MPs inadvertently found themselves on the fringe of 
mainstream politics.3 Individuals moved fluidly between groups such as the Monday Club, National 
Front and League of Empire Loyalists, moving with ease along the political spectrum depending on 
the circumstances that presented themselves. The term ‘far right’, therefore, will be taken to refer 
to ideas that sat further right than official Conservative Party policy, and does not, in this instance, 
necessarily refer to any form of extremism. The term ‘moderate right’ will be used to describe the 
Conservative Party.  
This paper will focus on the period 1960-1973 as this marks the era when decolonisation was 
definitively and openly accepted by politicians of both major parties as a necessary policy, however 
it must be recognised that this period and justification is, to some degree, arbitrary. The temporal 
marking of a post-colonial era is by no means clear-cut in the case of the metropole; for an ex-
colony, the post-colonial period clearly begins with that nation’s independence, however Britain 
relinquished her colonies gradually over the twentieth century, making it more difficult to put a date 
on the beginning of Britain’s post-colonial adjustment. There is a strong case to be made for 1947 
marking the end of empire, for that was the year that Britain lost her most-prized possession, India. 
Here, there is ample evidence of elites (notably, such as Winston Churchill) who struggled to come 
to terms with the loss.4 There is an equally strong case for using 1956, the year of the Suez Crisis, as 
a marker; certainly in retrospect, the Suez crisis has served ‘as a convenient watershed to separate 
the years in which Britain’s survival as an independent world power seemed possible (and desirable) 
from the subsequent era which saw the rapid liquidation of the colonial empire.’5 One could also 
argue for the existence of a post-colonial state of mind from as early as the inter-war years, when 
Britain accepted the policy of eventual self-government, or as late as 1982, which signalled the end 
of Britain’s final explicitly imperial war in the Falklands. This paper, however, will purport that the 
post-colonial era in Britain began in February 1960, with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s ‘Wind of 
                                                          
3 Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, 404. 
4 Veerathappa, British Conservative Party, 37.  
5 Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, 223. 
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Change’ speech in Cape Town, South Africa. The Gold Coast, famously Britain’s most politically 
advanced colony in Africa, had already been granted independence in 1957; however, Macmillan’s 
speech in 1960 signalled that this Tory government was prepared to grant independence to more 
territories in Africa. Until 1960, there were limited indications that the bulk of British Africa was 
ready for independence; however, Macmillan’s speech indicated that his government intended to 
thrust independence upon African states, whether they were ready for it or not. Indeed, by 1968, 
most of Britain’s possessions in Africa had been given independence. This study ends in 1973, with 
Britain’s accession to the EEC marking a new focus for British foreign policy, away from the Empire. 
However, future research on British post-colonial readjustment need not be limited to the years laid 
out in this paper; one could argue that even to this day, the use of colonial-tinged rhetoric by 
governing ministers suggests that British politics is still yet to be fully ‘decolonised’.6 
In order to explore the nature of resistance to the new post-colonial order, this study will examine a 
variety of documents, ranging from published journals such as Candour, by A. K. Chesterton’s League 
of Empire Loyalists, and the National Front’s Spearhead, to speeches by Tory government minister, 
Enoch Powell, and pamphlets issued by the Monday Club. Given that few individuals explicitly 
opposed decolonisation itself, an analysis of these documents enables us to examine how imperialist 
attitudes continued to be channelled indirectly through issues affecting Britain as it transitioned into 
its new world position. Through an analysis of rhetoric and ideas in these documents, it will be 
shown how resistance to a post-colonial world was articulated in ways other than resistance to 
decolonisation. There existed a plethora of right-wing groups between 1960 and 1975, including 
organisations such as the National Democratic Party, the British Defence League, and the Immigrant 
Control Association, which could plausibly be included in this paper. However, given the national 
scope of this paper, this study has chosen to focus on groups and individuals that were national in 
reach, and that enjoyed varying, but generally relatively high levels of publicity and recognition. 
The chosen sources allow the broad national reaction to right-wing rhetoric to be gauged from 
parliamentary debates and newspaper references. Given that this study seeks to explore how far 
right-wing activity reflected a wider British inability to come to terms with Britain becoming a post-
imperial power, newspaper articles are useful for showing how issues were framed and presented to 
the public, and also for indicating how relevant and popular particular issues were (or were not) for 
the readership of any given newspaper. This study therefore primarily uses the most widely 
circulated broadsheet newspapers in Britain between 1961 and 1976: the Times, the Telegraph and 
                                                          
6 ‘Boris Johnson: Brexit mustn’t leave us a ‘vassal state’’, The Times, 17 December 2017.  
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the Guardian, which will be taken to broadly represent mainstream opinion.7 Although this will 
enable us to gain a broad idea of how right-wing imperialist rhetoric was received, this paper does 
not claim to fully illuminate the realities of public opinion on decolonisation. Such a claim would 
require a separate study of popular culture, for example through books, plays, films, music, and 
newspapers, which is outside of the scope of this paper.  
Through an analysis of political rhetoric, this paper will argue that resistance to the post-colonial 
order did not simply mean resistance to decolonisation; it also referred to grappling with changing 
conceptions of race, social order, monarchical function, and parliamentary representation. While 
historians such as Porter argue that to include debates over ideas such as monarchy, constitution 
and race is to over-extend the meaning of empire, this paper argues that in the British case, given 
that these ideas and concepts are inextricably tied to Britain’s imperial experience, it is fully valid to 
include them in a discussion of post-imperial adjustment. 
It is important at this stage to establish more fully a working definition of both imperialism and 
colonialism. Imperialism refers to the theory, ideology and practice of a ‘mother country’ or 
metropole that rules or dominates foreign territories; colonialism, on the other hand, refers to the 
settlement of colonies on foreign territories. Writing in 1994, Said argued ‘In our time, direct 
colonialism has largely ended; imperialism, as we shall see, lingers where it has always been.’8 This is 
in line with the argument of this paper (within the specified time brackets). By 1960, Britain was 
outwardly becoming post-colonial; in other words, Britain had already let go of several colonies and 
had openly, explicitly accepted that remaining colonies would soon be given independence. 
However, in 1960, Britain was far from ‘post-imperial’, because, as will be illustrated, British politics 
and ideologies remained saturated with the residue of empire. To give colonies on the periphery 
self-governance was but one side of the coin; on the other was the overhaul, in the imperial, 
metropolitan mind, of the paternalist, racist, progress-driven attitudes that had supported 
imperialist structures. While, today, many would argue that we live in a post-imperial age, 
international relations are still plagued by unequal power structures, with states continuing to use 
the same age-old moral and economic justifications for pressurising less powerful states into certain 
courses of action. This paper, however, limits its focus to a thirteen-year window at a crucial time in 
Britain’s imperial history. As there exists no noun to describe the metropolitan equivalent of the 
peripheral process of decolonisation (i.e. de-imperialisation), this study will refer to this process as 
the decolonisation of Britain, or the British mind.  By arguing that a meaningful proportion of society 
                                                          
7 Fisher, Denver & Benyon, Central Debates, 197. 
8 Said, Culture and Imperialism, 9. 
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struggled to come to terms with the new post-colonial order around the 1960s, this paper shows 
that while the British Right may (eventually) have accepted that colonies had been lost, they did not 
give up the imperial state of mind, meaning the ideologies that drove empire, and the institutions 
that sustained it.  
While the British Empire is generally well-documented, the history of late- and post-imperial Britain 
remains incomplete. Traditional imperial historians tended to look at the grand-narratives of empire, 
exploring the causes for both its proliferation and its decline. In the post-colonial era, emphasis 
shifted towards the periphery, as historians sought to examine the agency of colonial subjects in 
determining the realities of empire. However, few historians have examined the legacy of empire in 
Britain, in the post-colonial era. Where historians have analysed the legacy of empire, it has been 
generally focused on the colonised periphery. For example, Barratt Brown’s After Imperialism 
focuses on the political hangovers from the colonial regime on the periphery, only addressing the 
metropole to summarise her economic ties to empire and to speculate on Britain’s future in 
corporate investment in an increasingly industrialised world.9 Addressing domestic imperial legacy 
has generally fallen to scholars outside of the historical discipline, often to cultural and literary 
critics. Such scholars tend to focus on a wider range of cultural texts than traditional historians, 
insisting on addressing how ‘the ‘hegemonic imperial project’ was primarily concerned with the 
production of derogatory stereotypes of other, alien, subordinated societies’, while neglecting to 
incorporate the ‘hard evidence’ of government documents, parliamentary records or trading 
figures.10  
Traditional historians moved away from imperial studies around the mid-1960s, which coincided 
with trends towards area studies which concentrated on the periphery, and comparative histories 
that compared the British experience to other empires.11 Later studies of imperialism incorporated 
the growing fields of women’s studies, environmental studies, and aboriginal/indigenous studies, 
and the 1990s saw the resurgence of broad survey histories of imperialism.12 Importantly for this 
study, in 2003, Stephen Howe wrote a speculative article, considering how ideas concerning crises 
within the British state might be linked to the process of decolonisation; his article ‘sketched what 
may be a suggestive, plausible case for seeing British ‘internal decolonisation’ or ‘becoming post-
colonial’ as a major theme, still awaiting proper investigation.’13 The process of ‘becoming post-
colonial’ is exactly what this paper seeks to analyse from the perspective of the British Right. In 
                                                          
9 Barratt Brown, After Imperialism. 
10 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, xvi. 
11 Winks, ‘The Future of Imperial History’, 655.  
12 Ibid., 663-6. 
13 Howe, ‘Internal Decolonization?’ 303. 
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doing so, this study contributes to a relatively new field within British imperial history, outlined by 
Howe.  
It is important to recognise that historians ‘are as much enmeshed in the temporal dislocations of 
modern times as anyone else’, and therefore it is beneficial to address one’s positionality.14 To argue 
of an inability to adjust to a post-imperial culture ‘is not so much a historical argument as a political 
or indeed, ethical (anti-racist) imperative,’ and it is a political imperative that is salient in current 
British politics.15 Following the 2016 referendum, Britain has begun the process of withdrawing from 
the European Union; this has caused the resurgence of themes which were pertinent in the 1960s 
such as race, British sovereignty and Britain’s great power status. As Britain looks to where it can 
turn for political and economic support, there are clear echoes back to the post-colonial transition of 
the 1960s. For example, in March 2017, Whitehall officials dubbed attempts to boost trade links with 
the African Commonwealth as ‘Empire 2.0’, similar to the way in which, during the 1960s, the 
Commonwealth was seen by many as a continuation of the Empire.16 The themes of this paper thus 
clearly remain relevant to contemporary politics, however, a diligent attempt will be made to keep 
this study within the confines of 1960-1973; no sweeping assertions will be made, claiming to draw 
linear connections between the themes of the 1960s to corresponding themes today.  
Beginning with an analysis of Britain’s reaction to the unilateral declaration of independence in 
Rhodesia, the first chapter of this paper introduces various key groups and individuals across the 
British Right and explores how they mobilised in response to the threat to white settler 
communities. This chapter highlights paternalist and racialist modes of thought, derived from 
imperialist thinking, that will be shown to be repeated in less explicitly imperialist avenues. The 
following chapter addresses activism against coloured immigration from Commonwealth countries 
and analyses the imperialist nature of British racism. The third chapter analyses questions of British 
foreign policy with regards to the Commonwealth and the EEC. This chapter argues that foreign 
policy expectations in the 1960s were driven by a sense of entitlement, derived from the power and 
uniqueness that Britain was accustomed to enjoying because of her empire. Finally, the conclusion 
draws the various examples together, demonstrating how debates over white settlers, race and 
foreign policy caused disagreements over imperial principles and modes of thought, and exposed 
the inability of a significant group in Britain to adjust to a post-colonial world.  
 
                                                          
14 Schwarz, ‘Memory, Temporality, Modernity’, 43. 
15 Howe, ‘Internal Decolonization?’, 290. 
16 ‘Ministers aim to build ‘Empire 2.0’ with African Commonwealth’, The Times, 06 March 2017. 
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Chapter One – A Constitutional Crisis in Rhodesia 
Macmillan, Macleod and the ‘Wind of Change’ 
The apparent contemporary political consensus over colonial policy is perhaps the clearest cause of 
historiographical neglect of political tensions due to the transition into a post-colonial world. In the 
late 1950s, the Conservative government made repeated appeals to Labour for a bi-partisan colonial 
policy, making the role of the Opposition somewhat redundant when it came to decolonisation.17 
The policy of eventual self-government had been broadly accepted early in the post-war period, 
however, by 1960, it was clear that gradualism had been abandoned. Criteria for independence such 
as ‘harmony among ethnic groups, economic viability, a developed infrastructure of voluntary 
organisations and demonstrably stable political institutions’, so often stressed by politicians and 
Colonial Office in the past, were now scarcely heard of, and many were taken aback by this new 
approach.18   
This hurried approach to decolonisation was a result of Harold Macmillan’s election in October 1959. 
Macmillan had initially been chosen as Anthony Eden’s successor, following his resignation in 1957 
over the Suez Crisis, largely due to his acceptability to Washington; it was hoped that Macmillan 
would be able to heal the ‘Special Relationship’ after the Suez debacle. According to Butler, there 
was enough from Macmillan’s prior record to suggest that he sympathised more with colonial 
populations than traditionally believed: for example, he had previously proposed that white settler 
land owners in Kenya be bought out by the state, so that land could be redistributed among African 
populations.19 However, in the early years of Macmillan’s leadership colonial policy was an issue 
which divided the cabinet; Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and Alec Douglas-
Home, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, had no desire to speed up decolonisation, 
thus preventing the pursuit of radical policies. This changed in 1959, when Macmillan, armed with a 
popular mandate, appointed Tory radical Iain Macleod to the Colonial Office. While the broad 
strokes of policy had been established before Macmillan’s accession to the premiership in 1957, it 
was Macmillan’s government from 1959 that would make decolonisation a priority. His radical 
approach, famously articulated in the ‘Wind of Change’ speech on 3 February 1960 in Cape Town, 
caused alarm within his own political party, and was the direct inspiration for the formation of the 
Monday Club.  
                                                          
17 (House of Commons Debates) HCD, vol. 569, cols. 690-1 (06 May 1957); HCD, vol. 571, cols. 1115-6 (04 June 
1957); HCD, vol. 578, cols. 820 & 911-2 (25 November 1957). 
18 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, 361. 
19 Butler, Britain and Empire, 136. 
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In treating this period of British politics, nominal bipartisanship must therefore not be mistaken for 
political consensus. As Goldsworthy argued: ‘Whatever might be said about relative harmony across 
the front benches, intra-party conflict remained: only its locus had moved across the floor of the 
House.’20 While the Labour Party had suffered divisions over colonial policy in the early 1950s, it was 
the Tories that were experiencing serious internal tensions a decade later. An issue which riled a 
significant number of Tories was the government’s treatment of white settler communities, Britain’s 
‘kith and kin’, in Africa.  
Fears that the whites were being abandoned were aroused early on in Macmillan’s new premiership, 
during the Lancaster House Conference chaired by Macleod in Kenya, in January 1960. It was one of 
several conferences, during which Kenya’s constitutional framework and independence were 
negotiated.  While there was ultimately limited agreement at the conference in 1960, Macmillan’s 
proposals to increase African power in both the legislative and executive branches of the colonial 
Kenyan government were significant. Macmillan had called for the creation of an elected African 
majority in the Kenyan Legislative Council, in addition to equal representation for Africans and non-
Africans on the Executive Council.21 This signalled a clear break from Whitehall’s earlier attempts to 
protect white settler privilege, providing a stark warning to those concerned about the protection of 
‘kith and kin’. It certainly rattled Lord Salisbury, a senior Tory peer who had served at the Dominions 
Office, Colonial Office, and Commonwealth Office throughout his political career. Salisbury, who in 
1962 accepted the office of patron of the Monday Club, was a die-hard opponent of British imperial 
retreat. Having held high offices in government and in the House of Lords, Salisbury was well-
respected and well-placed to lead a credible movement to stop, or at least slow down, 
decolonisation. In March 1961, Salisbury attacked Macleod’s colonial policy in the House of Lords, 
arguing that Macleod had adopted ‘especially in his relationship to the white communities of Africa, 
a most unhappy and an entirely wrong approach. He has been too clever by half.’ Referring to 
proposals that would increase African political power and therefore decrease white political power, 
Salisbury accused: ‘The Europeans found themselves completely outwitted, and they were driven to 
the conclusion… that it was the nationalist African leaders whom the Colonial Secretary regarded as 
his partners, and the white community and the loyal Africans that he regarded as his opponents, in 
the game he was playing.’22 This trope of playing games and government deception is one that is 
seen repeatedly in the discussion on treatment of white settlers in Africa.  
                                                          
20 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, 364. 
21 Butler, Britain and Empire, 157. 
22 (House of Lords Debates) HLD, vol. 229, cols. 307-8 (7 March 1961). 
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Concessions made in the January 1960 Lancaster House Conference also sparked the formation of 
the Rhodesia Lobby, just one month later. The group’s core was primarily made up of individuals 
that had consistently lobbied for the protection of imperial interests during controversies in the 
1950s such as the Suez Crisis and the Cyprus Emergency; it thus included members such as Salisbury, 
John Biggs-Davidson, Anthony Fell, Lord Hinchingbrooke, Patrick Wall and Paul Williams.23 The Lobby 
advocated against any further constitutional advance in Kenya, and against any self-government in 
Central Africa until white consent was obtained. Gradualism had been the policy of the British 
Government towards Africa, certainly since the early post-war period, and the Lobby believed that 
breaking with this policy would be catastrophic not only for the white minority communities, but 
also for the black majorities. Crucially, the Rhodesia Lobby sought not to save British Africa from 
independence, as eventual self-government was British policy from at least as early as 1943, but to 
save it from the chaos they believed it would descend into, should majority rule come prematurely. 
For the Lobby, saving British Africa would come down to saving the Conservative Party from its 
ideological drift away from empire, evident from Macmillan’s determination to grant African nations 
independence. It seemed as though the Conservatives were losing their traditional values, and if the 
remaining empire was to be saved from disaster, contemporary trends needed to be stopped. The 
Rhodesia Lobby thus began by focusing its efforts on keeping the Central African Federation (CAF) 
intact. 
The Breakdown of the Central African Federation 
In the early 1960s, government policy towards the Federation of Nyasaland and Rhodesia, also 
known as the Central African Federation, again seemed to show disregard for the interest of white 
communities. The Federation, established in 1953, was an experiment in economic interdependence 
between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland; however, despite its economic success, 
political issues caused Macmillan to call time on the Federation earlier than expected. The 
Federation had initially been created in the face of opposition from educated Africans in Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and significant domestic opposition in Britain; unsurprisingly, therefore, 
African nationalism in these regions continued to focus its energies against the Federation, and 
towards a widening of the franchise. African nationalism grew to fever pitch in Nyasaland towards 
the end of the 1950s; the return of activist, Dr Hastings Banda to the territory in July 1958 was a 
pivotal event in the nation’s history. In the nine months between Banda’s return and Westminster’s 
declaration of a state of emergency in March 1959, political agitation intensified to the point of 
                                                          
23 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, 366. 
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‘leading to the virtual collapse of colonial authority in substantial parts of the territory.’24 In many 
other African countries, Banda would perhaps have been an acceptable leader to the British; as an 
articulate, anti-Communist politician, leading a broad popular movement striving to make 
Nyasaland/Malawi a self-governing nation within the Commonwealth, the British had every reason 
to view him as a suitable, collaborative leader, had it not been for Banda’s staunch opposition to the 
Federation. Ultimately, Banda’s appeals for constitutional advance fell on deaf ears, and the 
situation continued to deteriorate to the point of the infamous ‘bush meeting’ of 25 January 1959. 
Informants claimed that at the meeting, plans were made for the indiscriminate killing of Europeans, 
Asians, and unsympathetic Africans, which compelled the Governor of Nyasaland, Robert Armitage, 
to declare a state of emergency on 3 March 1959.25  
While the research question laid out in this paper does not require a detailed examination of the 
process of resolving the Nyasaland Emergency, the government’s key responses to the crisis were 
deeply significant for the British Right. Firstly, at the Nyasaland constitutional conference between 
July-August 1960, Macleod conceded an African majority in the legislature. At a second conference 
in November 1962, Britain agreed that Nyasaland would receive full self-government, and, crucially, 
the right to leave the Federation.26 Banda’s election as prime minister in 1963 spelt the end of 
Nyasaland’s involvement in the Federation; by July of the following year, despite resistance from 
federal prime minister Roy Welensky, Nyasaland had become the Independent State of Malawi.  
As the Nyasaland Emergency unfolded, the British Right organised itself in defence of the white-
controlled Federation, through resistance to African political advancement in Northern Rhodesia. 
The federal government had clear links with the Conservative Party in both houses of Parliament; 
members such as Sir Stephen Hastings, Ronald Bell, Julian Amery and Patrick Wall were ‘in constant 
touch with Rhodesian Federal leaders’, in an attempt to coordinate a campaign to save the 
Federation, by slowing Macleod’s plans for political reform in Northern Rhodesia.27 On 9 February 
1961, senior backbencher Robin Turton (Thirsk and Malton) tabled an Early Day Motion (EDM), with 
the help of Lord Salisbury and John Biggs-Davison, designed to commit Macleod to the principles of a 
White Paper drafted by the previous colonial secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, in 1958. In practice, this 
meant restricting the franchise in Northern Rhodesia to ‘those who are contributing to the wealth 
and welfare of the country and who are capable of exercising it with judgement and public spirit,’ 
                                                          
24 McCracken, Malawi, 345. 
25 Ibid., 350-3. 
26 McIntyre, British Decolonization, 51. 
27 Stuart, ‘Party in Three’, 72. 
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which would stop Africans from acquiring power too quickly and would maintain power in the hands 
of the white federal politicians.28 
Within four days, the motion had 68 signatures, which attracted attention in the press. The Times 
reported that the motion was a stark warning to Macleod, who was ‘thought to be forcing the pace 
of African advancement to political power in Northern Rhodesia dangerously hard.’29 The phrasing of 
the motion suggested that publicity was not its principal aim; rather, backbenchers simply sought 
quiet confirmation from Macleod that his proposals for Northern Rhodesia would be within the 
framework set out in the 1958 White Paper. However, the issue of interest for the Times was the list 
of names written under the motion, beginning with Robert Turton. Described as a ‘backbencher of 
the most serious and responsible kind’, the newspaper’s political correspondent clearly felt that 
Turton’s involvement was crucial in attracting the support of men such as Sir Douglas Glover, Sir 
Spencer Summers, and Sir Gerald Wills. Listing six more moderate Conservative MPs, the article 
argued that these men were ‘typical of those most realistic of Conservatives politicians who quietly 
see it as a main part of their function to act as the gyroscope that gives stability to the Parliamentary 
Party… They are, in fact, politicians by commitment neither of the right nor the left, but in an 
important sense the centre men who slightly shift their weight, when their instinct tells them the 
need arises.’30 The motion eventually went on to receive 101 signatures, representing over one third 
of Conservative backbenchers, affirming that it was more than just the hard-core, imperialist right of 
the party engaging in another futile attempt to delay decolonisation. Rather, there was a wider 
feeling, an ‘instinct’, that something fundamental to the Conservative Party was at stake. One can 
only speculate what triggered that feeling with regards to Northern Rhodesia; it is likely that many 
felt that in this case, particularly where the welfare of white settlers in the Federation was at stake, 
the wind of change was blowing far too quickly for comfort.  
The challenge to Macleod over his proposals for Northern Rhodesia ultimately dissolved without 
significant incident; through skilful presentation of his plans to both the House of Commons, and the 
Colonial Affairs Committee, Macleod convinced those in the centre of the Tory party that his plans 
adhered to the principles of Lennox-Boyd’s White Paper. In the end, it became clear that if it were to 
come to a formal parliamentary division, the majority of the Conservative Party would back the 
Colonial Secretary. While the conclusion of this challenge to the government may arguably suggest 
that the whole episode was insignificant, this EDM was the only occasion on which the Conservatives 
                                                          
28 Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues, 368. 
29‘Warning Shot Across Mr. Macleod’s Bows’, The Times, 13 February 1961. 
30 Ibid. 
2086700 
13 
 
witnessed such a significant rebellion against the party leadership on the issue of decolonisation.31 It 
was a rare formal expression of backbench concern that the leadership was moving too hastily, and 
it briefly revealed that a broad section of the parliamentary party had an ‘instinct’ toward the 
protection of a code tied to imperial policy, that appeared fundamental to Conservative principles. 
Backbench rebellion against the leadership was rare, perhaps because of repeated emphases on 
party unity, perhaps due to an unwillingness to embarrass a Conservative government, or perhaps 
because most of the party was as ‘progressive’ as its leadership. However, it will be shown in this 
paper that that undefined ‘instinct’, tied to the Conservative Party’s imperial tradition, cropped up 
time and time again across the various groups that composed the British Right, exposing a 
discomfort with the transition of becoming postcolonial.  
The Central African Federation was officially dissolved in December 1963; however the Federation 
had suffered its fatal casualty by the 1961 Victoria Falls Conference which granted the right of 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to independence. Crucially, however, Southern Rhodesia, which 
had long enjoyed high levels of autonomy, was denied this right until certain terms had been 
fulfilled. In the minds of a number of Conservative MPs and peers, the white settlers in Southern 
Rhodesia had been deliberately wronged and betrayed, and memory of that betrayal lingered until 
Smith’s declaration of independence in 1965.  
Rhodesia: A Declaration of Independence 
The escalation of events in Rhodesia caused a serious intensification of political pressure within 
Britain to protect white settler interests in Africa. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
by the Rhodesian Government, led by Ian Smith, occurred on 11 November 1965; it was condemned 
as an illegal action by British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and it presented a major political 
problem for those on Parliament’s front benches. Southern Rhodesia (also referred to as Rhodesia) 
had been a self-governing colony since 1923, and a member of the Central African Federation 
between 1953 and 1963. As a chartered company territory, the region had always been something 
of an anomaly when considered alongside Britain’s other imperial assets, and, crucially, its white 
settler minority of around 200,000 in number were unaccustomed to interference by London.32 The 
UDI was a culmination of disputes between Britain and Rhodesia concerning the terms of 
independence, namely ‘majority rule’.  
British far-right groups responded emphatically to Rhodesia’s declaration of independence. For 
example, Spearhead, the magazine edited by John Tyndall, leader of the Greater Britain Movement, 
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dedicated numerous articles to the cause. Tyndall was a crucial actor on the British Right; formerly a 
member of A. K. Chesterton’s League of Empire Loyalists, Tyndall was a founder member of the BNP 
in 1960, the National Socialist Movement in 1962, and the Greater Britain Movement in 1964. He 
went on to endorse the National Front in 1967, as a means of uniting and strengthening the British 
Right. In the first Spearhead issue following the UDI, Tyndall wrote ‘We are passionately and 
unequivocally for Ian Smith. The present establishment in Britain is, in varying degrees of passion 
and equivocation, against him… Should history eventually be called upon to record the final fall of 
British power and civilisation, will it console us to know that at every stage of that fall the principles 
by which we were guided were absolutely and irrefutably right – right at least as they appeared to us 
at the time? Or will we be conscious only of the fact that our era has finished; that we have entered 
our twilight; that we can no longer play a mighty part in the affairs of men?’33 Tyndall’s article 
referred to several bastions of empire, and cornerstones of Conservative tradition including: history, 
power, civilisation, principles, loyalty and the Crown. While Tyndall called for Rhodesian 
independence, he hailed Rhodesia as fundamental to Britain’s future influence. Describing the 
nation as ‘glorious’, ‘wonderful’ and ‘a monumental national asset’, Tyndall projected a rose-tinted 
vision of what Rhodesia was, and what it could become.34 In this sense, it was clearly an article 
written by an individual who had not given up on the imperial mindset that had once made Britain 
the strongest power in the world. 
The League of Empire Loyalists (LEL) also took a pro-Rhodesian position. The LEL was formed in 1954 
by Arthur K. Chesterton, a former leading member of the British Union of Fascists, in response to the 
consensus politics of the 1950s. The Economist coined a term for this consensus in February 1954 – 
Butskellism – combining the names of Hugh Gaitskell, Labour Shadow Chancellor, and R. A. Butler, 
Tory Chancellor, who were perceived to have converging economic policies.35 Butler’s liberal 
Conservatism and the increasing number of liberal Tories who were accepting a lesser role for Britain 
on the world stage created a vacuum on the British Right, which the League hoped to fill.36 The LEL 
put up Independent Loyalist candidates for election in the 1964 general election; at this time, Anglo-
Rhodesian relations were tense, and a key part of the Loyalists’ platform aimed at fighting 
‘governmental attitudes towards Southern African problems.’37 Once Rhodesia had declared 
independence, Chesterton strengthened his organisation’s support of Rhodesia, claiming that ‘kith 
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and kin’ were ‘being systematically betrayed.’38 However, the LEL had peaked in mainstream 
influence due to publicity stunts during the late 1950s, therefore in 1965 the organisation focused 
on action rather than propaganda. In response to oil sanctions imposed by the British government, 
Chesterton and his supporters organised the transportation of petrol to Rhodesia.’39 The LEL’s 
practical approach meant that they had an insight into the attitudes of Rhodesians, observing that 
‘nearly every Rhodesian, though probably himself British, denounces Great Britain’ due to 
sanctions.40 The LEL therefore was less hopeful than Tyndall’s GBM that Rhodesia would play an 
important part in Britain’s future.  
On the more moderate right, the Conservative Party was significantly split. These divisions were 
clear from the disparity between the assertions of the party leadership and members of the Monday 
Club, even before the UDI. The Monday Club was a thinktank composed of Conservative Party 
members, which sought to produce ‘recommendations and suggestions based on Conservative 
principles and bearing on current government policies.’41 Having argued against African political 
advance in Central Africa, on the grounds that Africans had not ‘learned to respect what we call 
democracy as an equitable method of government’ and that the threat to the Federation constituted 
a threat to the principle of multi-racialism, the Monday Club was clearly positioned on a fine line 
between extremism and respectability.42 The Monday Club was strongly linked, due to overlapping 
membership, to the Anglo-Rhodesian Society, which was formed on 9 September 1965 with the help 
of funds from Rhodesia. Up until the creation of the Anglo-Rhodesian Society, the Friends of 
Rhodesia group on the right of the Tory party had caused the Central Office limited concern, because 
its perceived extremism had deprived it of donations and therefore resources.43 However, financed 
by donors in Rhodesia and equipped with the organisational resources and credibility of the Monday 
Club, the Anglo-Rhodesian Society represented a serious threat to party unity.  
On 6 October 1965, over one month before Smith’s UDI, two articles in the Daily Telegraph 
highlighted how far the views of the Monday Club were from the party leadership. On the front 
page, it was reported that Conservative Party leader, Edward Heath, had made a statement 
affirming that ‘there is bi-partisan agreement on the principle of unimpeded progress to the majority 
rule in Rhodesia and that a unilateral declaration of independence, an illegal act, will no more be 
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recognised by a Conservative than by a Labour Government’.44 However, in a letter to the editor in 
the same issue of the Telegraph, Patrick Wall M.P., friend of Ian Smith and prominent member of the 
Monday Club, quietly warned those who threatened British retaliation against a UDI. Wall proposed 
resolution of the dispute on the basis of the 1961 Constitution ‘which could be modified to provide 
for a large increase in the number of voters and, at the same time, to ensure that power does not 
yet pass to the majority race,’ which was clearly at odds with Heath’s support for ‘unimpeded 
progress’ towards majority rule.45 Wall’s statement was in line with the Monday Club’s agreement 
with the principle of eventual black majority rule. The Monday Club never expressed when this 
would be a practicable option; indeed, some members within the Monday Club ‘made comments 
that suggested ‘eventual’ was synonymous with ‘never’.’46 
After the declaration of independence on 11 November was faced with bipartisan accusations of 
illegality, at least on the front benches, the next logical step was to impose sanctions on the 
Rhodesian government. On 21 December 1965, an Order in Council was placed to ‘implement the 
embargo of all petroleum products to Rhodesia,’ which left Heath in a difficult position.47 Supporting 
the oil sanctions would open him up to accusations that Britain’s ‘kith and kin’ had been abandoned, 
while opposing them would leave Heath vulnerable on account of appearing to endorse a racist 
white regime’s actions. The result of this conflict was an embarrassing three-way split in the 
Conservative Party; the official party line was abstention, however 31 Tory MPs backed the Labour 
government, while 50 MPs voted against them. When one considers that this involved 27 per cent of 
Tories rebelling against their leadership, given that between 1945 and 1974 there were only fifteen 
occasions on which 10 per cent or more of Tory MPs voted against the front bench, it is clear that 
this division was extremely abnormal, and therefore represented a deeply significant issue for 
rebels.48 As evidence will show, this backbench rebellion proved that a significant section of the 
Conservative Party was still inclined towards the protection of imperial interests.  
In the run up to this vote, Heath had been put under pressure by the right wing of the party to 
condemn punitive sanctions. The Tory leadership had gone to considerable lengths to prevent a 
formal vote on the threat of penal sanctions at their party conference in October 1965, in Brighton, 
and in mid-November, the leadership had called in around a dozen rebels individually to urge them 
not to force a vote in the Commons on sanctions.49 However, after receiving unintentional 
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encouragement from Alec-Douglas Home, who had called for dialogue with Ian Smith in an attempt 
to unite the party, 90 Tory MPs signed a motion of censure on 16 December 1965, ‘deploring the 
Prime Minister’s policy of ‘unconditional surrender’ and welcoming the call for dialogue.50 By 20 
December, 119 MPs had signed the motion, and the key point of interest, as with the Early Day 
Motion on Northern Rhodesia discussed above, was the spread of the rebellion from the hard core 
right to moderate, centrist Tory MPs. Ultimately, only 50 of those MPs voted against the 
Government and the Conservative Party leadership, meaning that around 70 Tories were 
uncomfortable enough to formally express discontent via a motion of censure, however were 
conscious enough of party loyalty to vote with the leadership in the division that counted. This group 
belonged to the political mainstream, and therefore understanding what may have driven them to 
move against sanctions is key to understanding whether those in mainstream continued to be 
influenced by an imperialist mode of thought.  
The arguments of the Monday Club in opposition to oil sanctions appeared somewhat contradictory; 
in a speech at a public meeting at Central Hall in February 1966, Biggs-Davison declared ‘We deplore 
the U.D.I., but we understand at least their reasons for it’, before stating ‘we in the Monday Club 
opposed sanctions from the start.’51 Biggs-Davison’s almost-condemnation of the UDI was 
inconsistent with the position on sanctions; it followed logically that if the UDI was accepted as 
illegal, consequences would have to follow. It is possible that Biggs-Davison felt obliged to publicly 
‘deplore’ the UDI, regardless of his own sentiments and those of the Monday Club crowd who urged 
Biggs-Davison to call the UDI ‘a necessity, forced by Wilson,’ in order to protect the respectability of 
the Monday Club.52 The Monday Club’s credibility would have been seriously shaken if it had 
supported Smith’s illegal action against the Crown.  
Those further right on the political spectrum saw Tory divisions over sanctions as petty and 
meaningless. Tyndall bemoaned that ‘when the electorate looked for a Tory lead against Wilson’s 
betrayal of our kinsfolk, the Tory Party let them down; making a half-hearted attempt to quibble 
over the minor details of Labour treachery.’53 For Tyndall, condemnation of the UDI itself constituted 
the betrayal of kith and kin in Rhodesia; this was a more consistent and logical position than that of 
the Monday Club, given that a condemnation of illegality and sanctions went hand in hand. 
However, Tyndall’s position meant endorsing a regime that had acted against the Crown; regardless 
of how popular, or otherwise, this view was, sedition and an illegal secession could not be openly 
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supported by anyone vying for a position in government. Why, therefore, did Tyndall ever expect the 
Tory Party to take this position? It must be considered that the Tories had long been the party of 
empire. Since the premiership of Benjamin Disraeli in the late nineteenth century, the Conservatives 
had confidently exuded the ethos of empire, using it to gain political capital over the Liberals and 
Labour. Organisations such as the Primrose League and Victoria League, which were affiliated to the 
Conservative Party, spread imperial values and encouraged voluntary work across the Empire and 
Commonwealth.54 The Conservatives’ reputation as the defenders of empire was self-perpetuated at 
least until the late 1940s, as was pointed out by the League of Empire Loyalists.  
In the 1964 general election, a number of candidates stood as Independent Loyalists on behalf of the 
LEL; campaign material from the constituency of Petersfield referred to the Tories’ imperialist 
background, highlighting how quickly the Tories had abandoned old views. Citing material published 
by the Conservative Central Office, merely fifteen years prior, the document read: ‘“The 
Conservative Party regards the British Empire and Commonwealth as the supreme achievement of 
the British people…  We pledge ourselves whether in power or opposition, to give active support to 
all measures designed to promote the unity, strength and progress of the British Empire and 
Commonwealth…The Conservative Party has never supported any decision taken at Geneva, Havana 
or elsewhere inimical to the general system of Imperial Preference, and we shall take all steps in our 
power to ensure that in future our liberty in this direction is not impaired.”’55 Just eleven years later, 
Harold Macmillan made clear that these statements were largely invalid under his leadership of the 
Conservative Party with his speech announcing the ‘wind of change’ in 1960; this had two key 
consequences. Firstly, many political outsiders, such as those in the LEL, unwittingly found 
themselves characterised as extremists while exhibiting views that were thoroughly mainstream 
little over a decade earlier and had been relatively uncontroversial in the century prior to that. 
Secondly, many within the rank and file of the Conservative Party, together with some in the 
parliamentary party, continued to express such pride in the Empire and Commonwealth. It is clear, 
therefore, despite the views of the Conservative Party leadership, why Tyndall expected Tories to 
come out in defence of Smith’s white minority government in Rhodesia; the Conservatives had long 
been the party of empire and continued to absorb members who shared pro-empire views. With the 
Conservative Party encompassing a broad spectrum of ideas across its membership, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that it suffered the embarrassing divisions it did over political advance in Northern 
Rhodesia, and sanctions in Southern Rhodesia.  
                                                          
54 James, ‘Conservative Party and Empire’, 514-5. 
55 C.6 ‘Only Fifteen Years Ago’, Petersfield Independent Loyalist Election Leaflet, 1964. AKCC. 
2086700 
19 
 
Justifying the Defence of ‘Kith and Kin’ 
How, then, can evidence of concern for the welfare of white settlers in Africa, of varying degrees 
across the right wing of British politics, be used to show that the British Right clung on to imperial 
values, resisting the post-colonial order? For some, concern for the protection of white settler 
interests clearly marked regret for the loss of empire. Defence of the white minority communities in 
Kenya, the Central African Federation and Southern Rhodesia represented the symbolic defence of 
what the rest of British Africa could have been, had decolonisation not been hastily pushed through. 
In the 1960s, Nigeria, Sudan and Congo-Kinshasa underwent civil war, and in almost all of the newly 
independent states a military coup seemed to be the principal alternative to one-party rule.56 With 
independent Africa seemingly descending into chaos, those who had warned against rapid 
decolonisation felt themselves vindicated. According to Goldsworthy, sympathy was correspondingly 
generated for Smith’s government in Rhodesia, ‘a country which seemed to stand as a testimony to 
what the other settler territories might have become.’57 This is corroborated by pamphlets published 
by the Monday Club; in a 1962 publication referring to instability in Kenya, it was argued that the 
‘British Government must not allow them [European settlers] and their African compatriots to be 
cast adrift in a newly independent state in which there is no real respect for the law, the rights of the 
individual, or property.’58 This was an argument typical of the Monday Club; repeated in a pamphlet 
which published a collection of speeches from a public meeting at Central Hall in 1966, the Club 
outwardly pressed that they were not opposed to the principle of self-government in Africa, but 
rather the speed of the decolonisation process because it compromised law and order. Patrick Wall 
MP argued that his criticism of rapid decolonisation was ‘valid, when we know that in the last few 
months there have been no less than four military revolutions in independent African countries.’59 
For the Monday Club, a respectable group within the Conservative Party, the condemnation of 
decolonisation on principle would have been political suicide. Eventual self-government had been a 
long-established bi-partisan colonial policy, and it was necessary if Britain were to maintain moral 
authority as custodians of civilisation and democracy. Criticising the speed of the process in the 
name of law and order, therefore, was the principal, and perhaps only, way in which the Monday 
Club could oppose further decolonisation and maintain its political credibility.  
Focusing on the defence of white minority regimes, however, exposed those on the right to 
accusations of racism, and threatened the respectability of the Monday Club. Groups on the right 
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thus tended to prefer use of the term ‘kith and kin’ rather than ‘whites’. Across the right wing, some 
believed in white superiority, while others in British superiority; this distinction becomes clearer in 
discerning attitudes towards Europe, which is analysed in depth in the third chapter of this paper. In 
the context of British Africa, however, the distinction between ‘whites’ and ‘kith and kin’ was largely 
an issue of semantics. The term ‘kith and kin’ was a sentimental one; it was a term of affection used 
by those who were sympathetic towards the formulation of white British society abroad, such as 
that which had developed in Rhodesia. More importantly, however, Britain’s ‘kith and kin’ were 
believed by many on the Right to be continuing the imperial mission of the late Victorian era; 
according to Mark Stuart, it was believed across the Friends of Rhodesia group and much of the 
Conservative Party rank and file that Britain’s ‘kith and kin’ in Rhodesia were upholding Christian 
principles and bringing civilisation to Africa.60 The defence of ‘kith and kin’ can therefore be 
understood as continued belief in Britain’s civilizational superiority and her moral duty to ‘teach’ 
Africans the Christian way of life.  
One must allow for nuance; it is likely that many who defended ‘kith and kin’, for example within the 
readership of Spearhead and Candour, a magazine edited by A. K. Chesterton, simply believed in 
white supremacy, and did not support eventual black majority rule. For those who truly believed in 
the rhetoric of the British Empire, black majority rule was the natural culmination of a policy which 
saw Britain ‘guiding’ Africans toward civilisation and democracy; this was not the case for many 
extremists who envisioned indefinite British hegemony. This suggests that support for ‘kith and kin’, 
as found in Spearhead and Candour by no means indicated belief in Britain’s moral duty to guide 
Africans towards civilisation. However, it was certainly the case among much of the Conservative 
Party; this sentiment was expressed emphatically by Lord Salisbury at the October 1965 
Conservative Party Conference in Brighton. He argued that the government was abandoning ‘our 
friends and kith and kin to the tender mercies of men who, the Government must know… are as yet 
totally unfitted to conduct any free form of government at all.’61 Salisbury’s loyalty towards Britain’s 
‘kith and kin’ overseas was matched by a conviction that the African majority in Rhodesia was not 
yet ready for self-government, thus ceding to the principle of eventual self-government. Salisbury 
thus remained in line with the old core of imperial thought, which conceded eventual independence 
as the culmination of British duty and achievement, but saw that as a distant reality.  
While activity and rhetoric in defence of white minority interests in Africa varied in intensity across 
the right wing, they shared the paternalist and white supremacist instinct which had characterised 
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British imperial thought. Political crises, such as the UDI in Rhodesia, brought various groups, which 
differed in aims, ideas and methods, together in defence of this instinct. For example, when 
independence was declared by Ian Smith in November 1965, the Monday Club was quick to act. 
Within a week, they convened the ‘Rhodesia Emergency Committee’, where they planned a large 
public meeting at Caxton Hall on 22 November. According to the Daily Telegraph, there were up to 
600 attendees, including twelve Conservative MPs; this was a significant number for a meeting 
arranged at such short notice.62 Monday Club meetings on Rhodesia, however, not only attracted 
respectable MPs and peers, but also members of organisations such as the Greater Britain 
Movement and the British National Party, who were more extreme in their views. Commenting on a 
large Rhodesia rally held by the Club at the Albert Hall in 1966, Tyndall was critical of most speakers 
who both failed to condemn the British government’s position on Smith’s UDI, and to condemn 
decolonisation, or ‘White surrender’ – as termed by Tyndall – on principle. However, Tyndall also 
reported that: ‘There was no doubt at all that the great majority of the five-thousand crowd had 
come to show their unfailing support for Ian Smith and the White Rhodesians.’63 What had drawn 
these five thousand people together from across the broad right wing of the political spectrum, was 
a number of factors, several of which were drawn from imperialist thinking: economic and political 
paternalism, and British civilizational superiority.  
At this stage, one must allow that there may have been other reasons for actions in support of white 
minorities in Africa. For example, parliamentary Conservative opposition to oil sanctions against 
Rhodesia was largely practical. Around 20 out of 50 MPs that voted against oil sanctions were 
members of Friends of Rhodesia, meaning they actively supported the Smith regime. According to 
Stuart, the other c.30 Tory rebels who voted against oil sanctions did so on a level of practicality, 
rather than ideology.64 They believed that sanctions were not an effective policy, and that it would 
simply strengthen the resolve of Rhodesians rather than force them into submission, which was the 
stated aim of the government’s policy. This was an argument against sanctions that was not 
confined to the imperialist right; for example, Iain Macleod, the famously progressive Colonial 
Secretary who was instrumental in forcing the pace of decolonisation in Africa, opposed sanctions on 
grounds of efficacy. Another example was Nigel Lawson, editor of the Spectator from January 1966 
and liberal Conservative, who argued that sanctions were impractical because there was no 
alternative regime-in-waiting in Rhodesia; this rendered the hope that a suffering population would 
turn away from Smith and towards a more moderate replacement moot.65 Ultimately, Prime 
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Minister Harold Wilson’s statement to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in January 
1966, asserting that economic sanctions would bring about the capitulation of the illegal regime 
within ‘weeks rather than months’ was proven to be wildly wrong.66 Those who voted against 
sanctions based on grounds of inefficacy had good reason to do so, showing that, certainly at a 
parliamentary level, numbers indicating activity in favour of white minority communities cannot be 
taken at face value to represent imperialist sentiment or thinking. In the case of the parliamentary 
division on oil sanctions against Rhodesia, there are strong indicators that many rebel MPs were 
motivated by practicality rather than imperial fervour.  
With that said, one cannot discount the possible influence of imperial thinking for the thirty Tory 
MPs who voted against oil sanctions but were not members of Friends of Rhodesia. Given that 27 
per cent of the Conservative Party rebelled against the leadership, it was an extremely abnormal 
division. It was a significant affair for 50 MPs to vote against sanctions, particularly when they could 
have taken the party line and abstained - an option which would have neither shown support for 
sanctions, nor embarrassed the new party leader, Edward Heath. The rarity of such a parliamentary 
rebellion, and its occurrence when the Conservative Party was in opposition and therefore unlikely 
to affect the government’s actions, suggests there was something more fundamental at stake. While 
no assumptions can be made regarding the motivations of each individual parliamentary rebel, the 
scale of rebellion, and the participants’ assumed knowledge that their actions would gravely 
undermine the authority of their leader, suggests that there were wider considerations than 
practicality, such as imperialist paternalism and a concern for ‘kith and kin’.  
Another alternative cause of concern for the wellbeing of white settler communities was grounded 
in personal financial interests. Goldsworthy notes that the Rhodesia Lobby gained impetus when 
Congo, a neighbouring state of the Federation, descended into chaos in 1960, seemingly proving its 
premature decolonisation. This presented a threat to several major companies whose investments, 
particularly in copper, straddled the Katanga-Northern Rhodesia border. Around fifty Tory company 
directors at Westminster, including Lord Salisbury who was a director of the British South Africa 
Company, thus had tangible personal financial interests in the political future of Central Africa.67 
Given the political volatility of newly independent African states, shareholders in such companies 
were perhaps likely to favour the comparative stability of British rule in Central Africa. However, 
Goldsworthy neglects to mention that many of these MPs and peers were no longer company 
directors in the region of Central Africa by 1965, weakening the above implication that many Tories 
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who were sympathetic towards Rhodesia voted according to their own financial interest rather than 
according to any imperialist principle.68 Even though some MPs maintained commercial interests in 
the region, it is difficult to prove that those who supported Rhodesia did so for commercial reasons. 
The British Empire has historically been tied to commerce, making it impossible to separate the two 
as voting impulses. One could argue that men such as Salisbury saw themselves as having 
responsibilities rather than interests in Central Africa; commerce could be seen as a form of fulfilling 
Britain’s duty to spread civilisation to Africa but via economic rather than political advance. In this 
interpretation, commercial interests would simply be a reflection of imperial ideology. 
How far, then, did political pressure concerning the rights of white settlers in central and southern 
Africa by those on the right of British politics reflect a wider inability in Britain to come to terms with 
the loss of empire? As Chesterton recognised, politics was about winning elections, and Rhodesia 
was not an issue that resonated with the public as a crucial electoral issue. He wrote in Candour: 
‘Rhodesia is five thousand miles away from the United Kingdom and the British people would not be 
significantly swayed by governmental policies towards Rhodesia (except perhaps if military means 
were used) to cast or withhold votes because of them.’69 However, Chesterton wrote this as criticism 
against Prime Minister Harold Wilson and what Chesterton regarded as Wilson’s shameless pursuit 
of votes over good government, rather than the general public. Imperial affairs, even at the height of 
the British Empire, were never the primary concern of ordinary Britons; directing empire had always 
been the pursuit of the upper- and middle-classes. This is the argument of Bernard Porter, who 
convincingly asserts that even at the zenith of the Empire in the late Victorian period, the majority of 
Britons were unaffected by colonial debates.70  
However, controversies surrounding the Central African Federation did cause empire to resonate as 
a more popular issue than usual. Not only were there indications that the rank and file of the 
Conservative Party were becoming unsettled, but popular opinion also shifted to show concern for 
empire. Gallup polling shows that the controversy over Turton's Early Day Motion on Northern 
Rhodesia in February 1961 provided a major breakthrough in attracting support for colonial issues 
from the British public. Between 1960 and 1964, respondents were asked what they perceived to be 
the most important problem facing the county, out of twelve possible responses including 'colonial 
affairs'. During this period, 'colonial affairs' was selected consistently by 1-6 per cent of respondents. 
However, between January and April 1961, concern for colonial affairs jumped to 18 per cent.71 This 
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suggests that almost a fifth of people were concerned either by the speed of political reform, or by 
the potential damage being done to the interests of white settlers in Central Africa. Either way it 
showed that there was a small group that reacted when empire was threatened, and resisted 
Britain's transition into a post-colonial world.  
Active popular resistance came in the form of local Conservative constituency associations, many of 
whom backed Smith's government in Rhodesia. An analysis of local newspapers indicated that 
various Tory MPs, including Patrick Jenkin, Martin Maddan, Anthony Meyer and Angus Maude, came 
under pressure from members of their local Conservative associations due to their voting stance in 
favour of oil sanctions in Rhodesia.72 It is difficult to determine what drove the actions of local 
branch and executive members that protested against pro-sanction Tories. They may have been 
angry that their representative voted with a Labour government instead of following the Tory party 
leader. Alternatively, they may have acted in defence of Britain's 'kith and kin' in Rhodesia, perhaps 
individually or perhaps as part of an organised campaign coordinated by the Anglo-Rhodesian 
Society. The Society was active in the constituencies which saw local protests against pro-sanction 
Tories, however it is difficult to prove that these protests were part of an organised campaign. That 
leaves us to speculate; it is the contention of this paper that this small group of protestors were 
moved to act by the same instinct that drove moderate Tory MPs to vote in defence of white 
minority interests.  
Overall, to use the observations of a contemporary article in the Spectator, the 'rump of the Central 
African lobby, the can't- let-down-our-kith-and-kin' brigade and in general the right wing of the 
[Tory] party' were clearly still guided by imperialist impulses.73 Openly agitating to slow the pace of 
decolonisation, this group clearly showed an inability to come to terms with the new post-colonial 
order that Macmillan and Macleod were striving to bring about. On the opposite side of the party 
were the 'younger progressives' who believed in the 'doctrine that bloodshed and chaos will 
certainly follow where self-government is granted to those who do not command the support of the 
majority of their populations.'74 This strand of the party sought to realign the party, shifting away 
from the Conservatives' imperial past, towards a post-colonial, internationalist future. Between 
these two groups, in the middle, was 'the great mass of Tory MPs who are torn between vague 
feelings of guilt about the Central African Federation and acute anxieties for the future of the 
Commonwealth and the monarchy.’75 The actions of this group, from agitating for slower political 
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advancement in Northern Rhodesia to the condemnation of oil sanctions in Southern Rhodesia, 
showed that there existed an instinct to protect imperial interests across much of the Conservative 
Party. While decolonisation was generally accepted as British policy, the rush to protect white settler 
interests showed that there remained certain devolutions of power that were unacceptable to many 
Conservatives; in this way, resistance to moving Britain into a post-colonial world was articulated in 
mainstream politics. 
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Chapter Two - Commonwealth Immigration and the Race Issue 
The Beginnings of Multi-Racial Britain 
Though concern for the welfare of white settler communities was largely confined to politicians and 
activists, immigration exposed the residual effects of empire across a much wider section of the 
population. While empire and Commonwealth migration to the UK had existed long before the post-
war era, the arrival of the SS Empire Windrush in June 1948 at Tilbury Dock, Essex, is considered the 
symbolic beginning of the unprecedented scale of non-white immigration that occurred in the 25 
years that followed.76 The ship which carried 492 passengers, largely Afro-Caribbean ex-servicemen, 
has been memorialised as ‘the originary moment of postcolonial diaspora’, or, in other words, the 
beginning of multi-racial Britain as can be seen today.77 According to a Cabinet Memorandum 
circulated by Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies in Labour’s post-war 
government, the arrival of the Empire Windrush was ‘a spontaneous movement by Jamaicans who 
have saved up enough money to pay for their own passage to England, on the chance of finding 
employment.’78 Commonwealth immigrants were entitled passage and residence in the UK under 
the 1948 British Nationality Act; the statute created the status of ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies’, and reaffirmed the principle that as British subjects, Commonwealth citizens faced no 
immigration control and had full citizenship rights.79    
The question of whether the British government actively solicited migrant labour in order to help 
rebuild Britain after the war is disputed. According to Creech Jones, immigration ‘was certainly not 
organised or encouraged by the Colonial Office or the Jamaica Government’, but rather it was a 
consequence of economic difficulty in the colonies.80 However, according to a Report from the Royal 
Commission on Population in 1949, immigrants of ‘good stock’ would be welcomed ‘without 
reserve’, indicating a need in the British labour market for a significant supply of workers.81 Those on 
the Empire Windrush were certainly welcomed by the Evening Standard who sent a plane to greet 
and welcome ‘the 400 sons of Empire’ that were arriving in London.82 Regardless of Creech Jones’ 
assertion, potential newcomers from across the Commonwealth heard of lucrative job opportunities 
in the UK, which led to a surge in immigration. According to Office for National Statistics (ONS), the 
non-UK born population of Britain rose from 1.9 million to 3.1 million between 1951 and 1971. While 
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Ireland consistently remained by far the largest source of non-UK born residents, the scale of 
Commonwealth immigration rose significantly, particularly from India, Jamaica and Pakistan. For 
example, the number of non-UK born Indians in Britain rose from 111,000 in 1951 to 313,000 in 
1971. The proportion of non-UK born Jamaicans in 1951 was so low that it fell beyond the scope of 
the ONS infographic, which looked at the top ten non-UK countries of birth, however by 1971 there 
were 171,000 non-UK born Jamaicans living in the UK.83 It must also be remembered that size of 
coloured populations was higher than these figures indicated, as these statistics did not count 
second-generation immigrants, meaning the UK-born children of those immigrants included in the 
analysis. 
The British government was entirely unprepared for the consequences of Commonwealth 
immigration. While Creech Jones’ Memorandum on the arrival of the Empire Windrush foresaw the 
potential short-term difficulties, with regards to employment and housing, that would be faced by 
the immigrant community, the government failed to foresee the long-term social difficulties that 
large-scale immigration would cause.84 The influx of immigrants caused major social instability in the 
UK. The first major manifestations of racial tensions were the Nottingham and Notting Hill race riots 
in 1958; however, it was not until ten years later, in 1968, that a mainstream, national discussion of 
race relations was provoked by Enoch Powell’s inflammatory speech on immigration.  
Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ 
John Enoch Powell, Conservative MP, had not always shown extreme views towards race; indeed, as 
Minister for Health between 1960-1963, he had encouraged the incorporation of coloured staff into 
the understaffed National Health Service.85 However, by 1965, Powell’s attitudes towards 
immigration were hardening and he began to talk about immigration controls and repatriation. In 
1967, Powell wrote an article in the Sunday Express entitled ‘Can we afford to let our Race Problem 
Explode?’, and in the same year he wrote various letters, including one to party leader, Edward 
Heath, warning of the deterioration of race relations.86 Powell’s warnings culminated in an explosive 
speech on immigration on 20 April 1968, to the Annual General Meeting of the West Midlands Area 
Conservative Political Centre, in Birmingham. The speech, delivered as the Race Relations Bill was 
being discussed in Parliament, warned of the dangers of immigration. Recounting the experiences of 
his constituents, Powell argued that immigration was transforming communities beyond recognition, 
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and that if immigration continued at the current rate, whites would soon become a persecuted 
minority in their own country. 
The speech, which resulted in Powell’s dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet, was extremely significant 
because it represented a marked departure from political convention. Powell was Shadow Secretary 
of State for Defence at the time, and it was unheard of for a politician of ministerial rank to use such 
sensational language. For example, Powell warned ‘in fifteen or twenty years [sic] time the black 
man will have the whip hand over the white man.’87 This type of rhetoric had hitherto been the 
reserve of those excluded from the political mainstream, certainly at a national level. It was Powell’s 
provocative use of language that forced Heath to dismiss him; the policies that Powell had 
promulgated in his speech were in line with Conservative Party policy, however his language was 
deemed irresponsible as a member of the Shadow Cabinet. The Birmingham speech was also 
significant due to its inclusion of stories of vulnerable, old women being victimised by immigrants; 
Powell gave credibility to the kind of anti-immigrant hearsay that until then had simply been pub 
chatter. Powell’s own political ideas were not entirely coherent; his ideology combined ‘economic 
laissez-faire, Little England, social discipline, trade before aid, loyalty to Ulster, and racism.’88 Yet, as 
shown by the reception of what became Powell’s career-defining speech, coherence and accuracy 
was largely irrelevant. Powell stirred the consciousness of the nation with emotive, patriotic 
language. For example, he criticised those who ‘knowingly shirk’ the discussion of immigration; the 
reference to ‘shirking’ was deliberate, as it denoted those who neglected their patriotic 
responsibility and thus betrayed their nation in the world wars.89 Shirkers had been derided in the 
press and in the streets during wartime; Powell’s speech thus played on wartime notions of 
patriotism and betrayal, causing it to connect to ordinary people who had participated in the war 
efforts.90 Powell combined this with the use of classical language, for example by making a reference 
to Virgil’s Aeneid; Powell said ‘Like the Roman, I seem to see “the River Tiber foaming with much 
blood.”’91 (It was this reference that caused Powell’s speech to later become known as the ‘Rivers of 
Blood’ speech.) Such language made the speech appear intellectual, giving it a sense of legitimacy. 
With the Birmingham speech therefore, Powell connected with a vast audience, stirring the 
emotions of the nation. The speech transformed the nature of immigration as a political issue, 
making it the issue which was to dominate politics and popular media, and it established Powell as 
defender of the English people and a credible leader of the anti-immigration movement.  
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The speech quickly gained national traction. Within days of Powell’s dismissal from the Shadow 
Cabinet on 21 April 1968, hundreds of London dockers and Smithfield meat porters marched on the 
House of Commons to protest his removal. On 23 April, 250 workers at the West India Dock voted 
independently of their union leadership in support of an immediate protest, and within an hour 
1,279 of 1,300 West India Dock workers were on strike. By that very afternoon, c.4000 dockers and 
porters across London had walked off their jobs in order to protest at Westminster against 
immigration and the Race Relations Bill.92 Within two weeks of the Birmingham speech, Powell 
received 110,000 letters containing 180,000 signatures; only around 2,000 letters did not express 
support for his ideas.93 This was spontaneous direct action from members of the public, without any 
organisation by a political party or trade union; significantly, many – such as the dockers and meat 
porters – were traditional Labour Party supporters, indicating a body of discontent that transcended 
normal political boundaries. Powell’s personal popularity soared after the speech, among 
Conservative and Labour supporters alike; according to an academic analysis of two Gallup polls, the 
proportion of people who supported Powell as the choice to succeed Edward Heath as party leader 
going into the next general election went from 1 per cent before the speech, to 24 per cent 
immediately after it.94 
Many within right-wing groups, such as the National Front, sought to capitalise on the attention and 
support gathered by Powell after the speech. The National Front (NF) was formed on 7 February 
1967, in response to the convergence of Labour and Tory policy on immigration in the 1966 general 
election, with both parties stressing a need for combining immigration control with policies to aid 
integration. The formation of the NF was an attempt to unite and strengthen right-wing nationalists, 
so as to present a stronger challenge to mainstream politics. Thus, in February 1967, A. K. 
Chesterton’s League of Empire Loyalists and Andrew Fountaine’s BNP merged to form the NF, with 
Tyndall’s Greater Britain Movement joining later that year.95 NF activists recognised that Powell’s 
popularity represented an opportunity. In 1970, the NF Action Committee wrote a letter outlining 
their complaints regarding Chesterton’s leadership of the NF; Chesterton opposed supporting Powell 
because of the divergence in their economic views. However, the letter showed that activists were 
eager to capitalise on Powell’s popularity – it argued: ‘Rightly or wrongly he is respected by a huge 
majority of the British people and to attack him incurs the hostility of that majority.’96 Powell’s 
speech did appear to have some positive impact on the NF. In summer 1969 Robert Taylor, organiser 
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for the NF in Huddersfield, described the effect of the Powell’s prominence: ‘Powell’s speeches gave 
our membership and morale a tremendous boost. Before Powell spoke, we were only getting cranks 
and perverts. After his speeches we started to attract, in a secret sort of way, the right-wing 
members of the Tory organisations.’97 Interaction and overlap between NF and Tory members 
tended to occur at a local rather than national level, but it was significant nonetheless.  
The Monday Club also threw its support behind Powell after his Birmingham speech; according to 
the Daily Telegraph, Powell received a telegram from the Monday Club stating, ‘You are not alone: 
the majority of the people inside and outside the Tory Party support you on this issue.’98 Powell was 
not a member of the Monday Club though he was often present at their fundraisers and dinners. The 
Monday Club denied that Powell had become leader of the British Right, particularly given his views 
on a ‘little England’ role for Britain, however it praised Powell’s ability to arouse a popular political 
consciousness. In a Club magazine it was written: ‘In a decade of increasing political sterility and 
bluntness of purpose Mr. Powell has sharpened the political wits of the electorate. Here lies his real 
value… indications are that changes will come and by no means entirely at the instigation of the 
Conservative Parliamentary Party.’99 It was clear that many in the Conservative rank and file opposed 
Heath’s decision to dismiss Powell from the Shadow Cabinet. The Monday Club recognised that 
Powell’s incitement of passions would make it difficult for the Conservative Party leadership to 
control the party, particularly at local level, and the pace of any political change on immigration.  
Powell’s popularity also meant that several prominent Tories in Parliament came out in support of 
him, less afraid of retribution due to popular support for anti-immigration rhetoric. For example, 
within days of the Birmingham speech Geoffrey Rippon, Shadow Housing Minister, demanded a 
probationary period be served by all immigrants, that Britain reserve indefinitely the right of 
repatriation, and that no illegal immigrant be allowed permanent residency, regardless of how long 
they had spent in the UK. Significantly, the Sun reported that ‘Mr. Rippon’s proposals may annoy 
some of his colleagues, but Mr. Heath will avoid any worsening of his party’s present open splits.’100 
Heath was in a difficult position; he could not condone hate speech as the leader of a major political 
party, but open opposition to what were evidently widely-held views would also be political suicide. 
This dichotomy between insisting on tolerance and respectability, and accepting that many in Britain 
held racist views towards non-white immigrants, represented a contradiction that was at the heart 
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of Britain’s attitudes towards race – this was a contradiction inherited from the days of the British 
Empire.  
The Kenyan & Ugandan Asian Controversies 
The tension between needing to uphold traditional values of British tolerance and morality, while 
pacifying popular racist sentiment was also evident in how east African Asians were treated. Around 
1968 and 1972, there were two significant waves of migration from east Africa to the United 
Kingdom; the first was from Kenya, and the second from Uganda. The Kenyan Asian episode, which 
occurred the same year as Enoch Powell’s Birmingham speech, was a result of Africanisation policies 
pursued by President Jomo Kenyatta’s government. Africanisation, which referred to the ‘practice of 
positive discrimination and the replacement of as many non-Africans by Africans as possible’, was 
enforced most radically through the 1967 Immigration Act and the 1968 Trade Licensing Act.101 The 
Immigration Act, which primarily targeted semi-skilled clerical and manual jobs, changed work 
permit requirements so that Asians were forced out of their jobs unless they obtained Kenyan 
citizenship, while also establishing a Kenyanisation Bureau which prevented the employment of 
foreigners in jobs which Kenyans could do. The Trade Licensing Act targeted the distribution trade, 
previously dominated by Asians, by progressively excluding non-citizens from trading specific items 
in specific areas. Combined with other pro-African policies, the result was gradual Asian emigration 
from Kenya; between Kenyan independence in 1964 and 1969, at least 50,000 Asians left the 
country.102  
At a time when racial tensions were running particularly high, the British government was concerned 
about the possibility of mass Kenyan Asian immigration, and its effects on social harmony; this is 
what led to the rapid passage of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which received Royal Assent 
on 1 March 1968. The statute ended the Asians’ unqualified right to enter the UK, provoking a fierce 
debate over British commitment to ex-colonial subjects left without local citizenship. In order to 
understand the argument in favour of Britain’s moral responsibility to protect the rights of Kenyan 
Asians, it is necessary to examine the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. Contrary to popular 
belief, east African Asians were not de jure exempted from immigration restrictions in the 1962 
statute, however it was widely accepted by civil servants and cabinet ministers that Asian minorities 
in Africa were entitled to British citizenship and residency.103 A pledge was allegedly made by the 
Tory government during negotiations for Kenyan independence in 1963, making a commitment to 
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minority communities to protect their British citizenship after Kenyan independence.104 This pledge 
was disregarded by the Labour government in 1968 on two grounds. Firstly, even if it were 
enshrined in legislation, no parliament can bind its successor. Secondly, Labour Home Secretary 
James Callaghan argued that British obligation to Kenyan Asians changed when Asian residents were 
guaranteed the right to Kenyan citizenship given they applied within two years. His opponents, 
however, argued that the Tory pledge of British citizenship was the very reason that many Asians 
saw no need to acquire Kenyan citizenship, therefore to refuse British citizenship the moment that 
Asians with no local citizenship were facing persecution would be highly immoral.105  
The Kenyan Asian issue and the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act were extremely divisive. For 
some, the statute was the ultimate appeasement of racial hysteria and a shameful piece of 
legislation. The Times reported from a perspective sympathetic to the plight of Kenyan Asians; for 
example, it reported that at ‘Birmingham cathedral a single bell tolled at midnight to announce the 
“shame” of Britain… Inside the cathedral 25 people knelt in silent prayer in an hour-long vigil of 
atonement for Britain’s “broken promises” to the Kenya Asians.’106 The newspaper launched a 
vicious attack on the Labour government, arguing: ‘The Labour Party now has a new ideology. It does 
not any longer profess to believe in the equality of man. It does not even believe in the equality of 
British citizens. It believes in the equality of white British citizens.’107 Racism was a powerful 
accusation that mainstream politicians attempted to distance themselves from; hence Callaghan’s 
eagerness to emphasise that the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill ‘must be considered at the 
same time, and in accordance with, the proposal of the Government to introduce a Race Relations 
Bill which will establish in this country equality of treatment in the very sensitive areas of housing 
and of jobs… Both these Bills are, in my view and my judgment, essentially parts of a fair and 
balanced policy on this matter of race relations’108  
However, many in Britain celebrated precisely that discriminatory nature of the new legislation. 
From this perspective, the statue proved the Labour party to be efficient and decisive in the face of 
high pressure, and ‘at last in touch with the working- and lower-middle-class voters to whom the 
government owed its office.’109 Enoch Powell and Duncan Sandys had campaigned on the issue from 
a distinctly racial perspective, receiving a positive reaction from the public. According to Walker, 
Powell’s stand on Kenyan Asians and his speech at Walsall in February 1968, in which he conveyed 
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his ‘sense of hopelessness and helplessness’ at the flow of immigrants, got him ‘the largest public 
response of his career.’110 The divided reception of Kenyan immigrants and the Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act highlighted the disparity between those who maintained ‘traditional’ British morals 
and ideals, and the reality of popular racism. For much of the twentieth century, the British Empire 
was justified by the notion of trusteeship, which purported that Britain was burdened with the 
responsibility of leading less capable or developed peoples towards Christian civilisation. British 
politics had thus long been underpinned by high moral expectations, combined with a paternalism 
that necessarily viewed (ex-)colonial subjects as inferior. These two conflicting underpinnings were 
brought into the open as British society, previously untouched by empire, struggled to respond to 
the Kenyan Asian problem.  
By the time the Ugandan Asian episode occurred four years later, another Immigration Act had been 
placed on the British statute books. This required immigrants to demonstrate a ‘close connection’ to 
the UK either by birth or via parents and grandparents. This put Ugandan Asians in a difficult position 
when in August 1972, Idi Amin, President of Uganda, announced that all Ugandan Asians had ninety 
days to leave the country. Around 50,000 of those affected, roughly half of all Ugandan Asians, were 
British passport-holders and hoped to gain entry to the UK.111 The response of the British 
government to Ugandan Asians was much more sympathetic than that afforded to Kenyan Asians 
four years prior. The government promptly set up the Ugandan Resettlement Board to direct the 
integration of refugees, and between 1972-4, 28,600 Ugandan refugees were resettled in the UK. 
The purpose of the Board was to minimise public discontent, and to therefore resettle refugees with 
as little attention and funding possible. The Board drew heavily on the experience of returned 
administrators from the ex-colonies; interestingly, while the Board answered to the Home Office, it 
was the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that provided initial advice on the employment of civil 
servants and administrative staff. Colonial or military experience was taken as a proxy for general 
administrative competence, which is likely to have had an impact on the mindset of many Britons: 
‘implicitly, if not explicitly, it sent a signal that the Ugandan Resettlement Board was treating the 
matter as a quasi-military ‘colonial’ problem brought home.’112 
Britain’s legal responsibility for the displaced Ugandan Asians, under both national and international 
law, was ambiguous. The colonial connection was clear; these Asians were there largely because of 
labour demands by the British Administration of the Uganda Protectorate, and the terms of 
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decolonisation in India, Pakistan, and Uganda meant that these Asians’ rights derived from being 
British citizens.113 However, British legislation in 1968 and 1971 had put strict limits on immigration 
and required prospective immigrants to demonstrate a ‘close connection’ to the UK. Both Uganda 
and India/Pakistan were independent, and Ugandan Asians had been afforded the opportunity, like 
Kenyan Asians, to acquire local citizenship rights. However, when the terms of independence were 
negotiated, Britain made a crucial concession. Given that Uganda refused to give resident Asians 
automatic citizenship rights, and that under the 1950 Indian constitution, persons not domiciled in 
India were prohibited from claiming Indian citizenship, Britain agreed that those east African Asians 
that did not adopt local nationality would retain the rights of citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies.114 In 1968, prior to the enactment of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, Callaghan made 
assurances in Parliament that any Asian citizen who was compelled to leave the territory in which 
they resided, would be accepted in Britain. However, this promise was not enshrined in law. 
Ultimately, the British government took primary responsibility for the resettlement of Ugandan 
refugees, stating: ‘we accept an obligation for these people. This country can in no way be accused 
of doing other than giving the most generous treatment to these unfortunate people.’115 Not all in 
Britain, however, agreed with this position, and there was a sizeable campaign from the Right 
against the settlement of Ugandan refugees in Britain.  
The Monday Club ran a highly publicised campaign against the entry of Ugandan Asians. Despite 
internal divisions over control and action, the Club’s press coverage in the latter half of 1973 was 
400 per cent higher than it had been the previous year, largely due to their Ugandan Asian 
campaign.116 The influx of refugees had led to the biggest wave of popular discontent since Powell’s 
Birmingham speech, making the public receptive to anti-immigrant campaigns. The National Front 
capitalised on this discontent and divisions within the Monday Club, leading to ‘the most hectic and 
successful six months the party had ever known.’117 The NF campaign focused on three key points: 
firstly, it attacked President Amin as the ugly culmination of black nationalism, thus ‘proving’ the 
unfitness of blacks to rule themselves. Secondly, the campaign opposed coloured immigration, 
warning of the oncoming of a race war in Britain.118 Thirdly, the NF attacked the weakness of the 
Heath Government, crucial to attracting disillusioned Tories; the party absorbed a significant number 
of such Tories who were alienated by the decision of the party leadership to help Ugandan refugees 
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with British passports. The National Front organised itself quickly in response to the refugee crisis. 
Within 24 hours of receiving the news from Uganda, they had organised a 100-strong picket to 10 
Downing Street, before returning to deliver a petition that evening. Within days, the NF organised 
protest marches to Uganda House and the Home Office, demonstrations at airports where refugees 
were landing, a leafleting campaign, protest statements in local council meetings, and other rallies 
and marches in collaboration with organisations such as the Monday Club. Between September-
December 1972, the NF’s membership grew by over 800 members, which was sizeable considering 
the NF’s total membership just five years earlier was around 2,500.119 This showed not only the 
success of their campaign, but the willingness of many to actively campaign on their behalf.  
Enoch Powell was also active in speaking out against the entry of Ugandan refugees; by 1970, Powell 
had little influence in the Conservative Party, but he maintained a high profile by campaigning 
against the EEC and the entry of Ugandan Asians. Examining three separate speeches given in 
August, October and November 1972, it is clear that Powell took particular issue with the 
government’s assertion that Britain had an obligation, moral or legal, towards Ugandan Asians. 
Powell argued that the intake of refugees ‘was a purely discretionary and political decision’ and that 
‘it was dishonest to present that decision to the public as a legal obligation.’120 The legal obligation 
was indeed ambiguous and given the British government’s reaction to the (less severe, but still 
significant) persecution of Kenyan Asians, there was good precedent for ignoring the refugees’ call 
for help, regardless of whether they held British passports. However, in the Ugandan case, Amin’s 
ruthless personality, backed by statements such as his declaration of support for Hitler, drew much 
public sympathy for the Ugandan refugees in Britain.121 This was reflected in the crucial work of 
volunteers on the Ugandan Resettlement Board, and in external voluntary associations supporting 
the integration of refugees in Britain.122 Therefore, the decision to admit Ugandan refugees was 
presented as a mixture between legal and moral responsibility. As articulated by Tory Home 
Secretary, Robert Carr, at the Conservative Party Conference, refugees were represented as ‘part of 
our Imperial heritage’ and ‘part of our Imperial responsibility’, ‘passportholders of ours’ who had 
become ‘refugees with no other country to go to.’123 Powell completely rejected the notion that 
Britain had legal responsibility towards passport-holders, which was true according to the various 
immigration acts that had curtailed Commonwealth immigration. Interestingly, however, Powell did 
not completely reject the idea that Britain had a moral responsibility towards refugees, rather he 
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refuted that Britain had greater moral responsibility because it was once the dominating power. He 
argued: ‘our obligation to the Ugandan Asians is the moral one we share no more than equally with 
all other nations, and much less than equally with their true home countries, notably India.’124 
Powell, unlike the British government, clearly denied any ‘hangover’ of imperial responsibility. 
The consideration of legal responsibility, moral responsibility, and public reaction in determining the 
British response to the end of empire, was particularly complex with regards to Kenyan and Ugandan 
Asian immigration. As shown above, Britain’s legal responsibility was ambiguous, and was therefore 
moulded to fit government policy in both cases. Moral responsibility was also ambiguous; both 
Kenyan and Ugandan Asians had received assurances from a previous British government, 
guaranteeing the security of their rights as British citizens. However, while some felt free to 
disregard those assurances, regardless of whether they were enshrined in law, others clung onto a 
sense of imperial responsibility, emphasising the British values of duty and benevolence towards 
(ex)-colonial peoples. The public response to the two waves of immigration was divided; while some 
felt threated by the influx of coloured populations, others engaged in voluntary work comparable to 
that of the Victoria League in the early twentieth century. These considerations and divisions were 
all at work when Britain was administering its empire. However, these two episodes brought the 
Empire home, to more Britons than had ever before been exposed to empire. This exposure 
magnified these ambiguities onto the British political scene, causing ordinary Britons to struggle to 
come to terms with the considerations of an empire that, while it was in existence, rarely caused 
them concern.  
From Grassroots Campaign to National Policy 
The impact of the Empire coming home, in the form of Commonwealth immigration, caused many 
ordinary Britons to turn to local anti-immigration activism. This occurred primarily in areas with 
immigrant-dense populations such as Southall, Walsall and Birmingham. For example, in Southall, 
anti-immigration activism began in August 1963 with the formation of the Southall Residents’ 
Association (SRA), a community pressure group that sought to influence the local council. That year, 
the SRA chairman and treasurer stood as BNP candidates in the local election, beating the Tories to 
come second to Labour. Understanding the significance of these local election results, Southall’s 
Labour MP, George Pargiter, risked condemnation from his own party by responding to the result 
with a call for ‘a complete ban on immigration to Southall.’125 Here, one can begin to observe how 
immigration caused local representation of political parties to regroup along new lines. In 1966 the 
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Tories on the local council began calling for a fifteen-year qualification period before immigrant 
families could join council house waiting lists; two Labour councillors were expelled from their party 
for voting with the Tories on this measure.126 It was not uncommon for party lines to blur, when it 
came to a vote on immigration issues. 
By 1964, local anti-immigration activism was beginning to have an impact on national politics. In the 
1964 general election, there was a major national upset in the constituency of Smethwick, a seat 
held continuously by Labour for twenty years. Here, a relatively unknown Tory named Peter Griffiths 
beat Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon-Walker, in a shock win. The slogan associated 
with Griffiths’ election campaign was: ‘If you want a nigger neighbour, vote Liberal or Labour.’127 
While Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson declared that Griffiths’ explicitly racist campaign would 
make him a ‘parliamentary leper’, the Tory parliamentary party warmed to Griffiths, who had 
somehow swung a significant number of voters from Labour to Tory, in an election where the trend 
had generally gone in the opposite direction.128 Smethwick was hereafter held up as an example of 
the power of the ‘race card’ in gaining an electoral advantage.   
Political parties at the national level began to shift in response to mounting anti-immigration 
pressure from below. The Labour Party had attacked the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 
passed by Macmillan’s Tory government, as ‘cruel and brutal anti-colour legislation’ that targeted 
immigrants from the coloured Commonwealth, while allowing the unrestricted entry of unskilled 
Irish labour.129 However, despite promising to repeal that statute if Labour came to power, the 
Labour government, elected in 1964, renewed the legislation and maintained immigration controls 
that were biased against coloured peoples.130 By 1965, Ray Gunter, Minister of Labour, confirmed 
the almost total ban on vouchers allowing entry for unskilled immigrants, and Sir Frank Soskice, 
Home Secretary, committed to the repatriation of illegal immigrants. Therefore, it had taken three 
years of political pressure in urban centres across the UK to ‘transform the Parliamentary Labour 
Party’s policy from staunch and principled opposition, to full-hearted enforcement of the 
Immigration laws.’131 The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act was arguably a culmination of this 
transformation. In 1967, the Labour called the Commonwealth ‘the greatest multi-racial association 
the world has ever known’; yet by passing the 1968 statute, the government stripped British subjects 
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possessing Commonwealth citizenship of the fundamental rights associated with that citizenship.132 
This rapid realignment by Labour was a clear reaction to grassroots activism and public sensitivity 
over immigration.  
The Tories also hardened immigration policy in response to public pressure. In the 1950s, the 
Conservative governments led by Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan had 
‘agonised over the adverse effects’ of limiting Commonwealth immigration.133 Conservative MP Cyril 
Osborne had been campaigning for immigration control from as early as 1952, however even by 
1961, the party leadership’s reaction to Osborne ‘was fervently (but vainly) to wish, as it had wished 
throughout the 1950s, that he would go away.’134 Yet, just one year later, Macmillan’s Tory 
government passed the first Commonwealth Immigrants Act, and Osborne had received a 
knighthood.135 Enoch Powell’s Birmingham speech in 1968 was instrumental to the further 
hardening of Tory policy. While Powell’s speech did not advocate any measure that was not already 
official party policy, the reception to his speech made clear that many of his supporters were in 
favour of more stringent policy. Realising the extent of Powell’s popular support, in September 1968 
Heath announced that Commonwealth immigrants should not receive any special status, meaning 
that they should be allowed to enter only on the same conditions as aliens, while also arguing that 
dependents should be subject to stricter controls.136 
In order to assess the ideas of Powell’s supporters among the Conservative rank and file, the 
Conservative Political Centre conducted a confidential survey in December 1968 across 412 
constituency groups. The findings indicated that 327 groups wanted to call an indefinite halt to all 
immigration, while a further 55 groups wanted a five-year stop to immigration combined with strict 
limits on the arrival of dependents. Some of the more extreme suggestions that were made included 
an apartheid-style system for organising housing, and permanent camps for immigrants.137 This 
clearly indicated that the majority of local Tory activists and councillors held much harsher attitudes 
that the party leadership over immigration. In response to this, and also to continued agitation by 
Powell over an immigration freeze and repatriation, Heath called for the toughest measures yet 
adopted by a major party in January 1969. He demanded that the government stop all further 
immigration within nine months, calling for the system to be changed to a permit-based system 
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allowing immigration only for specific jobs, cities and time periods, and with no dependents.138 
However, while these policies indicated a significant hardening of official Tory policy, evidence 
suggests that the leadership remained reluctant to act upon its demands. On 11 February 1969, 
Duncan Sandys introduced a bill to the Commons containing the demands outlined by Heath less 
than a month prior. Despite Heath’s outward support for the proposed measures, he abstained on 
the vote. 126 Conservative MPs voted for Sandys’ motion including prominent members such as 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, Alec Douglas-Home, and Tory chief whip, William Whitelaw.139 This 
incident showing the inconsistency and lack of agreement among the party leadership was not 
unique. For example, in 1962 Douglas-Home adopted a policy of assisted repatriation and 
resettlement. However, when Powell suggested the creation of a Ministry of Repatriation to execute 
this policy, he was shut down by Heath.140 The vote on Sandys’ bill showed that there was a 
considerable body of opinion in the Conservative Party that had strict views towards immigration. 
While it is difficult to ascertain how, when and why these views developed, it is clear that supporters 
of immigration control were able and willing to be increasingly assertive due to the growing 
popularity of such ideas. However, the Tory leadership faced the dilemma between capitalising on 
the electoral popularity of immigration control and the need to maintain a distance from racism, 
inflammatory rhetoric, and the incitement of race hatred. 
British Racism and its Imperial Connection 
So far, this chapter has highlighted how anti-immigrant, and often racist, rhetoric gained traction in 
Britain in response to post-war immigration from the Commonwealth. Many argued that racial 
tensions were an entirely new phenomenon in Britain, unheard of before the Second World War. For 
example, an election leaflet from an Independent Loyalist (standing on behalf of the League of 
Empire Loyalists) in the 1964 general election argued: ‘By far the most damnable betrayal [of British 
interests] is the flooding of the United Kingdom with hundreds of thousands of people who have 
created a colour problem in a realm where no colour problem has ever before existed.’141 It would 
be accurate to argue that Britain’s ‘colour problem’ only became a salient issue in mainstream 
politics and media for the first time, when the majority of Britons were directly confronted by a 
legacy of empire, Commonwealth immigration, for the first time. Until then, imperial administration 
had been largely confined to the upper and middle classes, meaning the majority of Britons were 
generally unaffected in their daily lives by empire.142 However, it would be inaccurate to argue that 
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societal attitudes, specifically attitudes towards race, were unaffected by empire during its 
existence. Britain’s attitude towards race had been problematic long before the arrival of the Empire 
Windrush in 1948, and as evidence will show, it was derived directly from her imperial past.  
The relationship between the British Empire and race was complex. Racism was one of various 
strands, together with, for example, patriotism, liberalism, chauvinism and adventurism, that formed 
British imperial culture. None of these strands were inherently imperialistic or fundamentally linked 
together; a nation did not need to be an imperial nation in order to exhibit some or all of these 
characteristics. It is therefore the argument of some historians, such as Bernard Porter, that 
‘imperialism has furnished a convenient scapegoat in recent years to explain racism’, when in reality, 
imperial Britain held less racist views than her European counterparts.143 This nuanced version of 
British racism is explored in further detail by David Cannadine, who convincingly argues that Britain 
unified its overseas empire in the image of its domestic, social hierarchy. He argued that the British 
Empire ‘was in large part about the domestication of the exotic – the comprehending and the 
reordering of the foreign in parallel, analogous, equivalent, resemblant terms.'144 While Edward Said 
would argue that this created a ‘coercive framework, by which a modern ‘coloured’ man is chained 
irrevocably to the general truths formulated about his prototypal linguistic, anthropological, and 
doctrinal forebears by a white European scholar’, Cannadine’s conclusions were more balanced.145 
Cannadine did not deny the importance of Enlightenment notions of race, but argued instead that 
the British Empire was not ‘exclusively about race or colour, but was also about class and status.’146 
Particularly after the Enlightenment, when looking at coloured groups collectively, Britons placed 
themselves at the top of the civilizational scale and ranked all other races according to their relative 
merits. However, Cannadine argues that this ‘did not subvert the earlier, individualistic, analogical 
way of thinking, based on the observation of status similarities and the cultivation of affinities’, 
which explained Britain’s respect for chiefs, emirs, sultans and nawabs.147 British racism was thus 
more complex than one that unquestionably declared the white man’s superiority over the coloured 
man. 
Another key characteristic of British treatment of coloured peoples was paternalism. It was widely 
assumed that the British Empire ‘uniquely stood for and promoted values of democracy, good 
governance, mutual tolerance, and respect for the individual; that 'Britishness' was not so much a 
matter of race and ethnicity as of cultural values, exported to the self-governing colonies through 
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British settlers but also to the 'dependent' Empire through example and education.’148 The notion of 
trusteeship, adopted by Britain around the interwar period, pushed the idea that the spread of 
civilisation and ‘Britishness’ would take at least several decades, and, until the colonies had been 
remoulded in Britain’s image, it was Britain’s moral duty to continue guiding lesser developed 
peoples. Clearly, much of this rhetoric was spun in order to provide outward moral justification for 
the Empire. However, Britain was misjudged in assuming that it could control how the limits of 
deliberately vague concepts such as trusteeship and eventual self-government were interpreted 
outside of Whitehall. The appearance of legitimacy mattered to the British government, both 
domestically and internationally, as Britain prided itself upon being a liberal, democratic nation. 
Certainly, with regards to most of British Africa, Britain’s need to maintain the appearance of 
legitimacy, coupled with the realisation that swift decolonisation was in line with the economic and 
strategic realities of Britain’s new position in the world, was what caused her premature departure 
from Africa.  
The need to maintain legitimacy and the moral high ground had implications for Britain’s policy 
towards race. The British government and its imperial supporters went out of their way to stress 
their belief in multi-racialism across the Empire, for example in the case of the Central African 
Federation. According to a pamphlet published by the Monday Club, keen defenders of the 
Federation, the aim of the CAF was to ‘provide an example of multi-racialism that can convince the 
rest of the world that the idea is workable.’149 This reinforced the self-perception of Britain’s role as 
teacher and guide towards a higher form of civilisation. The article explicitly compared the aims of 
the Federation to South Africa’s apartheid policy; in doing so, the Monday Club sought to emphasise 
the apparent moral superiority of the British Empire in comparison to alternative regimes. The 
pamphlet continued, arguing: ‘The Federation by showing itself in practice to be truly multi-racial, 
with its firm, progressive government, great natural resources (and therefore capital), also has the 
stability and moral authority to entitle it to the leadership of Africa.’150 From this statement it is clear 
how moral legitimacy was tied to Britain’s authority to govern in Africa. Britain justified its empire in 
the twentieth century using the rhetoric of morality; in turn, Britain was thus bound to acting upon 
its moral rhetoric if it was to maintain the outward legitimacy necessary to hold the Empire. In the 
context of race, Britain’s stated commitment to multi-racialism meant that the government had no 
choice but to condemn the racist governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, regardless of the 
backlash it would face at home for doing so. 
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Britain’s stated belief in multi-racialism became particularly problematic when the Empire came 
home via Commonwealth immigration. The Enlightenment notions of race that underpinned the 
Empire were vocalised by an increasing number of Britons as they came face to face with large 
numbers of ex-colonial subjects. At the more extreme end of the spectrum, Tyndall’s Greater Britain 
Movement described the immigrants as ‘sub-human’, and as ‘bringing with them the same crime, 
disease, and filth by which their society is stamped in Africa.’151 However, while this demonstrates 
the perceived inferiority of coloured peoples by certain individuals in Britain, Tyndall’s followers 
were never exponents of multi-racialism. More telling of the contradiction within attitudes towards 
race, therefore, are the views of the Monday Club, which superficially continued to promote racial 
harmony, while thinly veiling beliefs in white superiority. For example, a Club memorandum on 
immigration affirmed: ‘We believe prejudice is dangerous, discrimination intolerable. 
Disillusionment caused by our prejudice dishonours the British tradition of tolerance and 
forbearance.’152 Here, the Club reaffirmed its opposition to racial discrimination, while 
acknowledging that ‘disillusionment’ with coloured immigration was indeed occurring. However, the 
memorandum went on to argue: ‘British society can validly demand from a newcomer a certain level 
of hygiene and social behaviour.’153 This clearly implied that a significant number of newcomers, in 
their opinion, were not complying to certain levels of hygiene and social behaviour, echoing (in 
kinder terms) the rhetoric of ‘crime, disease, and filth’ used in Spearhead. 
For some within the Monday Club, the influx of immigrants led to a revaluation of the liberal rhetoric 
that had sustained the Empire for so long. Now that social liberalism and morality were no longer 
convenient to British interests and it was time to discard them. According to George K. Young, a Tory 
radical who associated with the National Front: ‘The liberal’s comfortable self-projection of himself 
as “Man” on to all mankind seemed to work so long as his cult objects were distant or harmless, 
such as heathen to be converted, the poor to be lavished with soup and good advice, the oppressed 
to be “liberated” at somebody else’s expense… In an increasingly illiberal world where human 
diversity is reasserting itself this attitude is increasingly difficult to maintain.’154 This suggests that 
Young believed in liberal interventionism only insofar as it did not intervene at home. Now that 
previously vulnerable groups, citizens of ex-colonies, were asserting their agency and taking actions 
that their former imperial overlords could not control, it was time to discard the ‘liberal-
humanitarian’ outlook.  
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Not all agreed with this position, however; the ‘liberal-humanitarian’ outlook scorned by Young was 
the direct inspiration for the Race Relations Acts in 1965 and 1968. The 1965 statute was a landmark 
in that it marked the first legislation in the UK to address racial discrimination, however its provisions 
for enforcement were weak. The 1968 statute was more rigorous; due to provisions making the 
refusal of housing, employment or services on the grounds of race illegal, this statute was seen as an 
attack on personal (white) freedoms. Debates on the 1968 Race Relations Bill were filled with the 
language of morality. For example, Baroness Asquith of Yarnbury, daughter of former Prime Minister 
H. H. Asquith, insisted that the issue the bill was concerned with was ‘above all else, a human issue, 
it is a moral issue, and an international issue.’155 In the Commons, on the Bill’s second reading, Home 
Secretary James Callaghan used the lexicon of ‘freedom’, ‘peace’, ‘responsibility’, ‘leadership’ and 
‘nobility’.156 In doing so, he was calling upon a long British tradition of appealing to a higher moral 
duty; British democracy, based on the representation of interests, was rooted in paternalistic ideas. 
Whether it was for the poor, working classes, or disadvantaged immigrants, it was Parliament's duty 
to legislate benevolently on behalf of those less fortunate, and unrepresented in the Commons.  In 
the case of the Race Relations Bill, the argument of moral duty won over the argument for personal 
freedoms, and the statute was passed.  
However, it must be remembered that the Race Relations Acts were part of a two-pronged strategy 
to deal with the discord caused by the arrival of coloured immigrants; the other half of the strategy 
was stringent immigration control, with funds for repatriation. This two-sided approach was a 
manifestation of a tension that had long existed in the British imperial state but had remained 
largely obscured until the 1960s. Until then, Britain had continued to project an illusion of imperial 
power grounded in liberalism, even reflected in the spectacle and pageantry of its decolonisation. 
However, with the loss of the African empire and the growing significance of domestic racial 
tensions, two conflicting notions, inherent in the Empire, came to a head. The Empire had long been 
grounded in British superiority, before it was transformed by social Darwinist ideas into a belief in 
white superiority. However, the Empire had also long been shrouded in the rhetoric of liberalism, 
morality and responsibility. In the 1960s, these conflicting impulses produced legislation that both 
restricted coloured immigration, and outlawed racial discrimination. The indecision of the British 
government and the division of not only the Conservatives but also British society showed that a 
broad section of society struggled to adjust to the reality of a post-colonial order where racial 
equality was the accepted international norm. While countless other countries suffered, and 
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continue to suffer, issues of racial disharmony, Britain’s case was unique in that it was derived from 
her unique experience as an imperial power.  
The deep social divisions in Britain in response to the Kenyan and Ugandan Asian crises, and the 
inflammatory rhetoric of Enoch Powell clearly show that British society was struggling to adjust to 
the new post-colonial order. Powell emerged as an active challenge to the political consensus that 
had been developed up to the mid-1960s; his popularity was a testament to the decay of the 
consensus itself. Britain was 'imprisoned within her dying imperialism', a crisis which tapped into 
'the submerged nationalism of the English, trying at least to give a reactionary content to its 
uncertainty, and appeal to the (…) national feeling of frustration and anger.'157 The uncertainty of 
the post-colonial transition divided both the Conservatives, and Britain at large, with some inclined 
towards the anger and resentment propounded by Powell, and others towards the spirit of 
internationalism and Europeanism, markers of the new world order.  
Having considered the arguments laid out in this chapter, it is less surprising than one may initially 
believe that racism acquired the degree of power it did over mainstream politics and debate in the 
1960s. As argued by Tom Nairn: ‘Once divorced from the powerful liberalism-from-above that 
previously regulated it, it [British consciousness] displays obvious affinities with the old fantasies of 
the white man’s blood and genetic aptitude for civilisation.’158 However, what Nairn failed to 
appreciate was that the 'liberalism-from-above' was maintained to a large extent at the 
parliamentary level, hence the passage of the Race Relations Acts and reluctance for party leaders to 
use racist rhetoric despite its evident popularity. In contrast, at a local level, where most were 
engaging with the legacy of empire for the first time, many were unable to face the realities of a 
multi-racial society, despite the traditionally-professed British values of tolerance and respect.  
Overall, the complex British reaction to race and immigration between 1960-73 showed that there 
was a wider inability, that extended beyond the British Right, to come to terms with the legacy of 
empire; in the case of dealing with race, right-wing discomfort was symptomatic of a contradiction in 
mainstream attitudes that indicated a difficulty to adjust to the post-colonial order.  
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Chapter Three – Foreign Policy in a Globalising World 
British Foreign Policy in the Post-War Era 
In 1945, it was widely believed in Britain that victory and sacrifice in the Second World War, which 
had demonstrated both military strength and moral leadership, entitled Britain to a strong voice in 
world affairs. There was a pervasive belief across the political spectrum that ‘Britain derived her 
uniqueness, as well as cultural, economic and political benefits, from her maritime and imperial 
contacts around the world; and that her independence and even survival were bound up with their 
preservation.’159 Despite granting independence to India and Pakistan in 1947, Britain’s Labour 
government showed no indication of relinquishing the Empire that was the source of British 
uniqueness and power. Rather, the Empire was to be reinvigorated through Britain’s development 
policy, which sought to combine limited political advance in the colonies with investment in socio-
economic development. Britain’s motives were clear; by channelling growing nationalist activism 
into local politics, Britain hoped to continue controlling her strategic geo-political interests, while 
encouraging an increased production of raw materials that would reduce Britain’s dependency on 
the dollar market. By establishing a revitalised empire, and cooperating with Western Europe, 
Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin hoped to create a British-led grouping that would rival the 
power of the US and the Soviet Union.160 
However, it soon became clear that Britain’s plans for development were not to come to fruition. 
Agitation in the colonies caused the acceleration of political reform, and poor planning led to the 
failure of socio-economic development; this, in crudely simple terms, led to Britain’s decolonisation 
of Africa. Britain’s hope of leading a powerful bloc shaped around the Empire thus disintegrated, and 
Britain began to seek a new world role. In the 1950s, as it became increasingly evident that rapid 
decolonisation was inevitable, Britain’s growing economic weakness, which constrained her military 
capability, eroded her status as a world power. Britain had become dependent on the USA for 
financial aid and technology; this led to political vulnerability, evident during the 1956 Suez crisis. 
The crisis occurred in October-November 1956 when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser 
nationalised the Suez Canal. The canal had long been crucial to British interests; Britain, along with 
Israel and France, therefore sought to regain Western control of the canal and overthrow President 
Nasser. However, following political pressure from the US and the United Nations, Britain was forced 
into a humiliating withdrawal, culminating in the resignation of British Prime Minister, Anthony 
Eden. According to Darwin, ‘Eden’s fall was a grim lesson in the unpredictable consequences of a 
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prolonged international confrontation both for the authority of the government and the loyalty and 
confidence of its supporters – especially under a barrage of international criticism.’161 The Suez Crisis 
had demonstrated Britain’s vulnerability, and reiterated that acting without the support of a large 
group could leave Britain friendless and isolated on the world stage.  
What, then, were Britain’s options? According to a Monday Club pamphlet published in 1963, there 
were three feasible alliances that Britain could make in order to strengthen her voice in international 
affairs. The first option utilised Britain’s old imperial links by merging the Commonwealth, the 
sterling area and possibly the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) into an economic and political 
grouping that could later make agreements with either the US or the European Economic 
Community (EEC). The second option was to join the EEC, knowing that it was moving towards a 
federal Europe. The third option was to align closely with the US and the old white dominions (which 
referred to South Africa, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and the Irish Free State), a grouping that 
could later make agreements with the EEC.162 The debates that occurred in the 1960s over Britain’s 
foreign policy direction were implicitly about the kind of relationship that Britain wanted with her 
imperial past. As the above options indicate, Britain could choose to align with the new multi-
cultural Commonwealth, the old (white) Commonwealth, or reject her imperial heritage by joining 
the EEC. It will be shown in this chapter that there was significant disagreement across the Right 
over Britain’s foreign policy direction. Some on the Right continued to believe in the historical 
connections forged by empire, while others completely rejected them, disillusioned by 
decolonisation. In an exploration of attitudes towards the Commonwealth and the EEC, a common 
theme emerges; generally agreed was the principle British uniqueness and great power status, a 
belief derived indirectly from empire and fundamental to guiding Britain’s foreign policy.  
A Commonwealth of Equals 
The term ‘Commonwealth’ was officially adopted as the name for the group comprised of Britain 
and the dominions in the Balfour Declaration, agreed at the 1926 Imperial Conference. The 
Declaration stipulated that Britain and the self-governing dominions were: ‘autonomous 
Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any 
aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by common allegiance to the Crown, and 
freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’163 These sentiments were 
codified in Section 4 of the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which established legislative equality 
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between the dominions and the UK. In 1949, at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, 
the London Declaration was issued; this Declaration made two changes to the Balfour Declaration in 
order to accommodate India, which voted in 1949 to reject the British monarchy and adopt a 
republican constitution. Firstly, the term 'dominion' was dropped in favour of 'sovereign states', and, 
secondly, the Declaration recognised King George VI as the head of the Commonwealth, in a position 
that was, in theory, separate from the monarchy. India was thus able to accept the 'King as the 
symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the 
Commonwealth', without having to swear allegiance to the King as its sovereign.164 The 1949 
Declaration thus marked the beginning of the multi-racial, politically diverse Commonwealth, as it 
can be recognised today.   
Throughout the twentieth century, the Commonwealth softened the image of British imperialism, 
making it more palatable to anti-colonial critics. It was presented as the culmination of a benevolent 
British imperialism – a voluntary union of free and equal nations. This image was strengthened by 
the joining of India, one of the most populated and prominent anti-colonial countries in the world; 
India’s membership did much to blunt anti-colonial criticism and it showcased British tolerance by 
including India in its group of equal nations. Extending the paternalist attitude which charactarised 
imperial Britain, the Round Table pronounced in 1960 that, similar to the Roman Empire which 
neither declined nor fell, ‘the British Empire has likewise not ended, but its children have grown into 
adult nations, preserving family ties without family discipline.’165 The ‘family ties’ referred to 
common values and institutions which the British Empire was believed to have spread such as 
democracy and good government, however, from 1948 onwards these bonds began to loosen as 
Commonwealth nations began to assert their autonomy. India’s republican constitution, approved in 
1948, represented the first blow as it rejected the shared monarchy that had been ‘the only 
constitutional bond uniting the Empire/Commonwealth after 1932.’166 Britain was outwardly proud 
to lead a group of free and equal nations, however, as the Commonwealth because increasingly 
diverse, it became evident that the transition from Empire to Commonwealth would be more 
problematic than the British had previously assumed.  
As international politics became dominated by two superpowers, some Britons looked to the 
Commonwealth as a way of maintaining global influence. According to former Indian Foreign 
Secretary Krishnan Srinivasan, the Commonwealth was ‘designed by the British political 
establishment to compensate those in Britain who mourned the loss of the Empire, and to provide a 
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surrogate for colonial rule.’167 Given that the Commonwealth was created in 1926, when the Empire 
was still strong, Srinivasan’s assumptions concerning the foresight of British politicians are likely to 
be an overstatement. However, the fact that so many ex-colonies chose to join the Commonwealth 
did indeed persuade some imperialists that British imperial power could be extended into the post-
colonial age. It was a popular view among some prominent Conservatives, such as Leopold Amery, 
former Colonial Secretary, who famously wrote in 1953: ‘other nations now outside [the 
Commonwealth] may well decide to join it in course of time… Who knows but what it may become a 
nucleus round which a future world order will crystallise?’168 Though Amery’s speculations never 
came to pass, perspectives on the presumed potential of the Commonwealth are useful in 
determining how far Britain was committed to its imperial past, and what it hoped to gain by 
embracing or rejecting its old colonial partners.  
Commonwealth Hopes & Expectations 
Ideas on how to restructure the Commonwealth were seldom agreed upon within and between 
groups across the Right, therefore the projection of generalised views onto individual groups is of 
little value. Specific names and organisations will be ascribed to ideas where possible, however, it 
must be recognised that limited evidence prevents us from knowing how much support there was 
for any given theory. Controversial issues, such as immigration, tended to generate more leaflets, 
speeches and articles, while also forcing prominent figures to take a clear public stance on the 
issues. However, debates on the Commonwealth were much less open and controversial, limiting 
our ability to gauge the impact of ideas regarding its expansion or reinvigoration. This section 
therefore places emphasis on the scope of ideas, demonstrating the variety of methods proposed to 
strengthen the Commonwealth and the extent to which these proposals were grounded in views 
derived from the British Empire. The range of conflicting ideas will be used to show the inability of 
the Right to accept what the Commonwealth had evolved into, culminating in a conviction that if the 
Commonwealth nations could not be returned to their subordinate status, the organisation had 
outlived its usefulness to Britain.  
As it was a heterogenous, voluntary association of states, some sought to cement Commonwealth 
ties in order to form a stronger, more cohesive group, that would better resemble the power blocs 
of the US and the USSR. Two clear possibilities were suggested: a modified form of Imperial 
Preference, and the Commonwealth as the basis for a new citizenship. Imperial preference was a 
system of preferential tariffs, negotiated at the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa in 1932, 
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through which Britain gave highest trade preference to domestic producers, second preference to 
imperial/Commonwealth producers, and put foreign trade last. It was possible that if such trade 
preferences were maintained after independence was granted to colonies, economic ties could unify 
the Commonwealth. However, in the 1930s, the dominions that enjoyed imperial preference were 
‘accustomed to treating Britain as a bottomless market for their produce and as an endless source of 
capital and migrants’; by 1960, Britain did not have the economic strength to fulfil that role, meaning 
Commonwealth nations turned elsewhere for trade, and thus weakened the economic ties binding 
the Commonwealth.169  
The second way of cementing Commonwealth ties was the creation of a common nationality. 
Common citizenship was supposed to 'symbolise the continuing unity, and hence strength of the 
'Empire-Commonwealth'.'170 In the early twentieth century, citizenship of the Commonwealth was a 
matter of convention rather than legal status. No serious attempt was made to legally codify this 
common nationality, until post-war changes in Canadian law defined Canadian nationality by 
Canadian citizenship, rather than British subjecthood; this undermined the assumed universal bond 
of subjecthood, and prompted Westminster to pass the 1948 British Nationality Act. The statute 
created the citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies, specifying that it was ‘to be held by 
persons born in any of these countries [colonies], or were offspring of a father born in any of these 
countries or by registration.’171 As discussed in the previous chapter, this led to the arrival of an 
unprecedented number of Commonwealth immigrants in Britain; mass immigration prompted the 
enactment of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, thus marking the end of the Common 
nationality. It was ironic that ‘those Britons on the political right, while tempted at one stage to put 
high hopes on to the new Commonwealth, were also often the most strident opponents of 
unrestricted immigration.’172 It spoke to an imperial idealism that was fused with the contradiction 
that Britain expressed over race. The vision for a shared Commonwealth nationality was proven to 
be hollow; it was an empty profession of shared values, which, as later became evident, few in 
Britain truly believed in. Despite decades, and in some cases centuries, of imperial rule which had 
projected British culture onto colonial subjects, by the 1960s many Britons expressed the view that: 
'The English have nothing in common with the Asian or Negro, they are completely out of character 
and alien to our way of life in every aspect.'173 By 1962, therefore, any ideal of a common nationality 
had been shattered by the reaction to mass immigration in Britain.  
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However, the end of the common nationality idea was only with regards to the new, multi-racial 
Commonwealth. John Tyndall's vision for securing Britain's global position was based on the old, 
white Commonwealth, made up of members of the 'British race' (referring to descendants of British 
settlers, or 'kith and kin'). Tyndall argued: ‘In the boundless lands of Empire and Commonwealth lie 
all the ingredients of modern power, waiting only for a determined national policy aiming at their 
full coordination and development in the service of the British future.’174 However, the (ex-
)dependent empire, or the (re)conquering of territories featured little in Tyndall's plans; arguably in 
the spirit of the new, anti-colonial world order, Tyndall focused on voluntary cooperation between 
the ex-dominions rather than coercion elsewhere. His proposals included: preferential trade 
agreements, alignment of defence strategies, British reconciliation with South Africa (estranged due 
to apartheid) and Rhodesia, and British emigration to ex-dominions to ease overcrowding. According 
to Tyndall, such a partnership would result in ‘the makings of a civilisation that could surpass in its 
splendour anything yet achieved in the history of man.’175 These references were clearly made in a 
spirit of, what John Darwin terms, 'Britannic nationalism', which amounted to 'an aggressive sense of 
cultural superiority as the representatives of global civilisation then at the height of its prestige' - an 
attitude that underpinned the British Empire.176 
While Tyndall's imperialist rhetoric had been left behind by mainstream political leaders by the 
1960s, the proposal itself was not necessarily unworkable. The dominions had been free of British 
control from the early twentieth century, and yet chose voluntarily to continue associating 
themselves with Britain, coordinating trade and foreign policy. Dominion loyalty to Britain was 
exemplified by their contribution to the war efforts, not only in terms of manpower but also 
economic resources and political loyalty. There was therefore some reason to believe that Britain's 
'kith and kin' abroad could form a strong political unit voluntarily, as it had shown loyalty for decades 
after achieving self-government. However, the Second World War transformed Britain's economic 
position, and thus fundamentally affected the basis of these strong Commonwealth relations. Firstly, 
as the Empire broke apart, Britain could no longer offer a strategic umbrella to its member states; 
this meant that Britain could no longer control the members' external commitments, which was 
crucial to Britain's global influence. Secondly, the war devastated British trade and investment, and 
changed Britain's colonial and Commonwealth partners from being her debtors to her creditors. As 
Britain could no longer fulfil the role of market, investor and supplier, the Commonwealth was 
turning away from Britain, looking elsewhere for trade.177 Tyndall's proposals betrayed his naive, 
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romanticised understanding of what held the Old Commonwealth together. It was not blind loyalty 
to the British race, or a commitment to furthering British civilisation; rather, it was concern to keep 
open channels of trade and influence that had kept the white Commonwealth in line with Britain. 
Once Britain had been knocked by war, and could no longer offer the same trade and influence, 'kith 
and kin' loyalty began to waver. However, Tyndall's faith in the emotional commitment of white 
Commonwealth nations to Britain was strong, reflecting his own inaccurate perceptions of 
contemporary British strength and the strength of Commonwealth goodwill towards Britain.  
The Round Table presented a much more modest vision of the Commonwealth than Tyndall. Instead 
of placing it at the centre of Britain's strategy to regain its status as a world power, the 
Commonwealth was presented as a 'bridge' between nations that held shared values as a result of 
British imperialism. The Round Table accepted that the Commonwealth was composed of nations 
from 'all parts of the world, at different stages of economic development, and with very different 
national interests and priorities.'178 The Commonwealth, in their view, was therefore to be a 
platform of exchange, rather than a vehicle for the formulation of common policies that would allow 
Britain and the Commonwealth to act as one bloc. This vision of the Commonwealth was arguably 
the most realistic, given that it closely resembles the role of the Commonwealth today. In contrast to 
Tyndall, the Round Table was, at least outwardly, positive regarding the multi-racial nature of the 
new Commonwealth. It argued: 'It is important to look at this [the multi-racial character of the 
Commonwealth] as a positive foundation for the development of the future Commonwealth, and 
not as a dilution of its more concentrated integrity under white hegemony.'179 The phrasing of this 
statement makes clear that the Round Table was aware that some viewed the new, multi-racial 
Commonwealth as a 'dilution.'180 Its stress on the importance of positivity, suggests that there was a 
need for it, or, in other words, that positivity towards the multi-racial Commonwealth was lacking. 
There are a number of possible reasons for this. Firstly, it may have been a result of racism, the 
impact of which had been exacerbated by the effects of mass immigration to the UK. Secondly, it 
may have resulted from a realistic appraisal of member interests; the fact is that the political and 
economic interests and concerns of the old Commonwealth had been much closer aligned. The 
accession of states which had different priorities, economic capacities, and strategic concerns did 
indeed dilute the ability of the Commonwealth to formulate unified strategies and act as one entity.  
For some, this realisation equalled disillusionment with the entire notion of the Commonwealth, 
given that its diversity made it powerless, and therefore limited its capacity for furthering British 
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interests; this was the view of Enoch Powell. As explored in the previous chapter, Powell led the 
campaign for the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which restricted the rights of Commonwealth 
nationals and undermined the concept of a Commonwealth nationality. In March 1963, Powell 
argued that British patriotism must not be founded 'on pretence that the Commonwealth is more 
than it really is or something different than what it really is.'181 It was part of a speech focused on 
British pride, in which he had earlier asserted: 'Britain to-day, after all the changes of the last 
decades, needs a new kind of patriotism.'182 These 'changes' could refer to a number of things, for 
example: decolonisation, Britain's increasingly apparent financial and political dependency on the 
United States, changing power relations in Europe, or perhaps the growing threat of the Soviet 
Union. However, the first three possibilities were closely connected; British autonomy had been 
predicated on her economic and political power, which came from her status as an imperial power. 
Two implications can therefore be drawn from Powell’s speech. Firstly, Powell believed that British 
patriotism had previously been grounded in Britain’s status as a world power, which was a result of 
her imperial status. By implying that some were misjudging the value of the Commonwealth, Powell 
showed his awareness that some were attempting to continue to channel British imperial patriotism 
through the Commonwealth, an organisation with superficial parallels, but one that was, in fact, 
fundamentally different. Secondly, by calling for a ‘new kind of patriotism’, Powell was essentially 
calling for a rejection of imperial patriotism.  
Powell’s anti-Commonwealth views were not simply a corollary of his racist views; he had no more 
hopes or expectations for continued cooperation with the old dominions, than he did for 
cooperation with the multi-racial Commonwealth. In response to Tyndall, who wrote to him about 
the potential of strengthening ties between white Commonwealth nations, Powell replied: ‘my 
judgement is that especially in Canada, but also in Australia and New Zealand, these [ties] are bound 
to diminish with the passage of time and that no political structure can be based on them.’183 His 
rejection of imperial links therefore transcended racial boundaries. While it is difficult to fully 
ascertain the reason for Powell’s rejection of empire, several commentators ascribe it to Powell’s 
disillusionment due to the failure of empire. Tom Nairn compares Powell’s attitude to that of 
disenchanted ‘ex-votaries of Stalin who, unable to bear what their idol had become, turned to 
denounce the god that had failed them. Powell reacted in the same way towards the political 
collapse of imperialism. Given that the failure, the disenchantment, had occurred, what was once 
the all-embracing, seductive truth could only be a tissue of lies.’184 Thus interpreted, Powell’s 
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rejection of the Commonwealth as a future vehicle of British influence was derived, in part, from his 
disillusionment due to decolonisation. However, one could also argue that Powell was driven by a 
realistic appraisal of the Commonwealth – an understanding that the Commonwealth truly was not 
an extension of empire, and therefore, in Powell’s opinion, of no use in furthering Britain’s global 
interests.  
It is important to recognise that debates on Britain’s entry into the European Economic Community 
(EEC) were happening at the same time as Commonwealth debates; Britain’s failed application to 
the EEC had a bearing on how the future role of the Commonwealth was viewed. After Britain’s first 
application to the EEC, which was submitted in August 1961, was rejected by the French President, 
Charles de Gaulle, the Monday Club began internal discussions on alternatives to the Common 
Market. In a memorandum, it was argued: ‘The Government must now act quickly on an alternative 
to the Common Market… There is now a great opportunity to plan a Commonwealth alternative 
hinged on the E.F.T.A. countries and Japan with discriminatory trade measures and the offer of a 
comprehensive package deal to those who wish to join us.’185 The EFTA (European Free Trade 
Association) was formed as an alternative, looser trading bloc to the EEC in 1960, and Japan was 
included as its trade was becoming important to Australia and New Zealand. The memorandum 
went into considerable detail over the practical steps necessary to proceed with their ideas, 
however, for the purposes of this paper, it is only necessary to draw out three key points. Firstly, the 
Monday Club’s proposal was shaped around the multi-racial Commonwealth; the step-by-step 
outline showed how agreements could be made between Commonwealth nations before other 
nations were invited to join. The Commonwealth was therefore to be at the centre of Britain’s new 
role in world affairs. Secondly, the proposals extended imperialist notions of development by 
ensuring that ‘cheap, quickly available commercial and technological training and education is made 
available to the underdeveloped countries, provided always that agreement could be reached on 
trade matters and that those countries were willing to accept the recommendations by the 
Economic Committee.’186 The rationale for Britain’s colonial development policy was that by 
providing education and training, along with infrastructural development, Britain could boost the 
economic productivity of her colonies, which would benefit Britain, while continuing to control the 
colonies’ foreign and economic policy. This old colonial policy was clearly reflected in the Monday 
Club proposal. However, one must allow that Britain was not the only country at the time offering 
financial aid with political strings attached. The fact that, for example, the USA gave nations aid in 
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return for anti-Communist support, indicates that we cannot comprehensively tie this Club proposal 
to Britain’s imperial past. Having acknowledged this, the memorandum’s reference to Britain’s 
‘responsibilities’ suggests a continuation of the moral rhetoric that characterised the Empire, 
suggesting that the Empire provided an inspiration, if not the cause, of such a proposal.  
The final point of observation is that the Monday Club had, perhaps deliberately, skewed what the 
Commonwealth was. While describing proposals for cooperation between equal nations, the 
memorandum pointed out that the Commonwealth ‘would have the benefit of a great and practical 
history of cooperation to assist it in the formulation of its future policy.’187 This implies that the 
Commonwealth had always been based on voluntary cooperation. If this assertion was based on the 
experience of the old Commonwealth, it not only failed to recognise the fundamental shift 
addressed above concerning Britain’s post-war weakness, but it failed to openly recognise that 
Britain’s relationship with her dependent colonies had always been different from the settler 
colonies. It was illogical to expect the same working relationship with the ex-dependent colonies, 
given the difference in what Britain had demanded from settler and dependent colonies.188 
Alternatively, if one considers that the assertion of a ‘great and practical history of cooperation’ was 
based on the combined history of the Empire-Commonwealth, then it was based on the 
misconception that the Empire had been an exercise of cooperation. The Monday Club’s assertion 
came close to confusing, if not conflating, the Empire with the Commonwealth, which suggested 
either a misjudgement of what the Empire was, or a misjudgement of what the Commonwealth was. 
This was a crucial to prolonging hopes for a strong Commonwealth. 
The Decline of the Commonwealth Idea 
Up to the early 1960s, the Commonwealth was seriously considered as a potential vehicle for 
promoting British influence on a world stage. In their 1955 manifesto, the Conservative Party argued 
that the Empire-Commonwealth was ‘the greatest force for peace and progress in the world 
today.’189 This belief was reemphasised by a Tory pamphlet in 1960 which asserted: ‘no political 
party would now dare to suggest publicly that the Commonwealth has outlived its usefulness. Today 
every political party is anxious to establish a reputation for unwavering devotion to this great 
heritage.’190 However, there was a shift in the 1960s which saw the tide turn against the 
Commonwealth; on 23 January 1966, the Sunday Telegraph declared that ‘the Commonwealth is a 
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disappearing myth.’191 The bulk of opinion had turned against the Commonwealth, largely because 
the reality of voluntary cooperation had not lived up to the hopes and ideals set out above, but also 
due to debates over the EEC and Commonwealth immigration.  
A key factor that caused disillusionment with the Commonwealth idea was the realisation that 
member states did not have common interests. By 1961, there was a non-European majority in the 
Commonwealth. It had not occurred to many of those who were initially optimistic about the 
potential of the Commonwealth that the membership of coloured nations ‘was not an expression of 
filial gratitude and loyalty. Rather it provided merely a convenient platform on the world stage, from 
which they could air their grievances.’192 Members were unafraid to oppose British policy, exposing 
clear evidence of diplomatic disunity. For example, in 1956, India and Ghana were two of five 
founding members that established the non-aligned movement, a movement which advocated a 
middle path for developing nations between the two power blocs in the Cold War. Unafraid to 
pursue a separate course to Britain, India and Ghana refused to bolster the ‘special relationship’ that 
Britain had fostered with the USA. Members were in some cases disunited to the point where they 
acted against each other. One example is the tension between India and Pakistan which resulted in 
armed conflicts in 1947, 1965 and 1971. Another example was the expulsion of South Africa, one of 
the group’s oldest members, in 1961 due to opposition to its policy of apartheid. This caused much 
resentment in Britain and dented right-wing support for the Commonwealth.193 For some across the 
Right, the expulsion of South Africa showed that the Commonwealth was of limited use as a means 
of exerting British power. Given the assertiveness of the new Commonwealth members in pursuing 
their varied diplomatic interests, the Commonwealth could not feasibly act as one, coherent power 
bloc.   
The Commonwealth members also had increasingly diverse trade interests, which destroyed any 
hopes of creating a trading bloc. As late as 1958, Britain had reaffirmed its commitment to the 
Commonwealth as a trading bloc at the Commonwealth Trade Conference in Montreal. However, 
over the 1950s, British trade with the Commonwealth had been declining. Between 1950 and 1960, 
the proportion of British exports going to Commonwealth destinations shrank from c.47 per cent to 
40 per cent; imports from the Commonwealth declined at a similar rate. There was also increasing 
concern in Britain that it was exporting too much skilled and professional labour overseas to 
Commonwealth nations, which was causing a talent gap in Britain.194 All of these shifts combined 
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showed that the Commonwealth was declining in importance for the British economy. It is important 
to recognise that these changes were matched by shifting trading patterns across Commonwealth 
member states. For example, by 1967, Canadian trade with the US was worth nine times more than 
Canadian trade with Britain. British trade with Australia had been surpassed by Japanese trade with 
Australia, and in both Australia and New Zealand, political leaders were embracing their ‘Asian 
destiny.’195 According to Tyndall, this was a direct result of Britain’s campaign to enter the EEC; he 
argued that due to the Common Market campaign, which would see Britain turn both towards 
Europe and away from the Commonwealth, the old Commonwealth had been made to feel 
unimportant, like ‘expendable commodities, to be used or cast away as the requirements of the 
moment dictate.’196 This, in his view, had weakened bonds of both trade and loyalty between Britain 
and the Commonwealth, limiting the common interests of the group and its ability to act as a strong 
power bloc.  
The Round Table agreed with Tyndall that Britain’s EEC application altered the viability of the 
Commonwealth, however, in contrast to Tyndall, the Round Table examined the effects of the 
application in Britain, rather than across the old Commonwealth. The Round Table argued that the 
debate over joining the Common Market wrongly presented the Commonwealth and the EEC as 
mutually exclusive options. Accordingly, the Commonwealth was perceived as ‘an obstacle to a more 
realistic pursuit of British interests,’ which caused a decline in support for the Commonwealth.197 
This was happening while mass immigration caused the Commonwealth to transform from being ‘a 
symbol and vehicle of white supremacism into a symbol and vehicle of multi-racialism.’198 
Immigration was viewed as the main legacy of the Commonwealth, and, as shown in the previous 
chapter, multi-racialism was a largely unwelcome phenomenon across Britain; it caused popular 
British attitudes concerning the Commonwealth to turn from disinterested to disapproving within 
just a few years. It is therefore clear how diverging trade and diplomatic interests, coupled with 
domestic unpopularity, caused many to become disillusioned with the potential of the 
Commonwealth as a means of exerting British power and influence across the globe. 
There were, of course, exceptions to this; some across the political right refused to accept that the 
Commonwealth was over as a meaningful grouping. A Monday Club pamphlet, authored by a 
member of the Club’s executive council, Victor Montagu, argued an emotional case for the revival of 
Commonwealth commitments in 1970. He argued that Britain should spend more ‘time and effort… 
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defending something more precious, more personal to us, namely our own constructive work 
throughout the centuries, corners of Colonial fields, where our kith and kin have settled, 
constitutions carefully modelled on our own, the professional services and the capital we have sunk 
in creating thriving new communities of all races.’199 Montagu based his appeal on prior British 
investment, emotional and financial; calling on Disraeli’s legacy, Montagu argued that Britain should 
not abandon the people that Britain had long been connected to by history, language and 
commerce. By referring to the United Nations as a ‘waspish collection of peoples, mechanically 
tabulated, in a sky-scraper of New York,’ the pamphlet indicated a sense of nostalgia for the history 
and romanticism of the Empire-Commonwealth.200 The romantic element was clear from references 
to a Commonwealth as a ‘powerful force’ for ‘world unity’, consisting of ‘sovereign nations freely 
associated’ with bonds extending ‘for a hundred years before 1945.’201 Writing in 1970, Montagu 
clearly belonged to a minority that believed the Commonwealth still had ties ‘as strong as links of 
iron,’ although it is difficult to ascertain how sizeable or significant that minority was. What can, 
however, be drawn from Montagu’s assertions is the continued fondness or nostalgia for the ideals 
of the Empire. The pamphlet had little basis in trading figures or diplomatic agreements; it was an 
appeal to history, to a tradition of cooperation between Commonwealth nations. This tradition of 
cooperation was of course a fantasy. Empire was about coercion and pressure, where Britain always 
negotiated from a position of strength. While by 1970, most had come to the realisation that the 
Commonwealth was to be nothing like the Empire and had abandoned ideas of Britain exercising 
global influence through the Commonwealth, there remained some, such as Montagu, who 
continued to believe in the emotional and historical commitment between Commonwealth nations 
as a basis for future cooperation. 
The dissolution of the Empire, and its replacement by the Commonwealth, was a challenging 
process. The representation of the Commonwealth by some as a continuation, or even culmination, 
of empire had two significant consequences. Firstly, it meant that the transition from empire to 
Commonwealth was expected to remain under British control, and that elements of old colonial 
relationships were expected to be maintained. According to May, ‘such expectations served the very 
useful purpose of smoothing the trauma of loss of ‘world’ power and of colonial rule.’202 However, 
this reassurance was linked to the second significant consequence, which was that it meant that 
Britain experienced a delayed reaction to decolonisation. Initial hopes for the Commonwealth, based 
on experience of colonial relationships rather than a solid understanding of contemporary 
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diplomatic and trade interests, extended into the 1960s. However, the weakening of Britain’s 
economic, military, and strategic position had occurred from as early as the Second World War. 
Unrealistic hopes for the Empire-Commonwealth had, to a significant extent, blinded many Britons, 
and caused a realistic debate on Britain’s position in the new world order to be delayed until the 
early 1960s.  
The Turn Towards Europe 
As Britain considered its relationship to the Commonwealth, it was also contemplating membership 
of a European Economic Community. In the 1950s, Britain was relatively ambivalent towards Europe. 
British imperial ambition and the sanctity of parliamentary sovereignty made her averse to the idea 
of supranational European institutions or a European political group, although Britain may have 
considered European cooperation under British guidance. According to Darwin, ‘it remained an 
absolute orthodoxy of British policy that membership of such a [political] community, or even of a 
European customs union, was fundamentally incompatible with Britain’s Commonwealth links, her 
global commitments and even with her special relationship with the United States.’203 However, in 
August 1961, the Conservative government made a formal application for the UK to join the EEC. 
This application was rejected by Charles de Gaulle in 1963; however, for the purposes of this study, 
the reasons for the initial application (and rejection) are largely irrelevant. What is significant is that 
the application sparked major debate, particularly but not exclusively across the Right, concerning 
Britain’s role in Europe and the implications of British EEC membership for her imperial, and 
Commonwealth commitments.  
The far right was divided by views on race; Tyndall and A. K. Chesterton rejected the Common 
Market in the belief that European were not united by kin. However, Colin Jordan, who co-founded 
the British National Party in 1960 and the National Socialist Movement with Tyndall in 1962, 
believed in the supremacy of the northern European race, and therefore welcomed a union of its 
people.204 Tyndall argued: ‘there is only one real basis for union – that of race.’205 Accepting that 
Britain needed to associate itself with a larger bloc, he argued that the racial disunity and lack of raw 
materials and living space would prevent Europe from being an effective power bloc. Instead, 
Tyndall proposed uniting the 90 million whites spread across the Commonwealth to ‘build the most 
powerful civilisation in the history of man.’206 This was the fundamental aim of Tyndall’s Greater 
Britain Movement, with ‘Greater Britain’ referring to those who belonged to the ‘British race’ but 
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lived beyond the British Isles. It is unclear how Tyndall’s vision of Greater Britain compared to the 
EEC alternative, given the lack of clarity on what Greater Britain meant in practical terms. Tyndall 
mentioned little, apart from increased British investment in the white Commonwealth nations, to 
clarify the nature of political and economic ties within such a union. Instead, when exploring the 
potential of the GBM, Tyndall made broad statements such as: ‘British history means nothing if it 
does not mean the systematic and progressive extension of British power into the far corners of the 
earth, whereby the British people could be guaranteed the means to permanently increase and live 
nobly in the manner of a great race.’207 What can be drawn from the rhetoric of ‘history’, ‘progress’ 
and ‘nobility’ is that Tyndall was more concerned with the grandeur and romanticism of the idea, 
rather than the practical economic and strategic benefits that may be gained from uniting with 
‘Greater Britain’. His rejection of British membership of the EEC was not based on any cost/benefit 
analysis, rather it was product of his fixation on grand narratives. Tyndall sought an option that 
showed linearity in British history, and therefore championed an option grounded in the British 
Empire.  
The more moderate right, meaning those within the Conservative Party, was also divided in opinion 
over Europe. The EEC was one issue of several, such as Rhodesia, immigration, capital punishment 
and social permissiveness, that caused controversy in the Conservative Party throughout the 1960s. 
Edward Heath, party leader from 1965 and prime minister from 1970, had little interest in 
Commonwealth issues and believed that Britain’s future lay in Europe. He faced considerable 
backbench opposition during his tenure over all of the above issues, however it was not necessarily 
the case that the same MPs that opposed Heath over Rhodesia or immigration also opposed him 
over Europe. While, generally speaking, the Monday Club gave organisational coherence to the right 
wing of the party, which opposed the often liberal-leaning stance of the leadership, it is important to 
recognise that there was no strict group of MPs that consistently opposed the leadership over 
controversial issues. The issue of Europe divided the leadership of the Monday Club, with John Biggs-
Davison coming out in support of the EEC and Victor Montagu against it. The majority of 
Conservative MPs backed Heath in joining the EEC, however there was a sense that this was 
reluctant. According to the Guardian, ‘the bulk of the party’ followed ‘Mr. Heath’s line as a sad 
necessity.’208 By the time Heath became prime minister in 1970, the bulk of the Monday Club had 
also acquiesced. Around 1972 the anti-Market movement gained momentum under the leadership 
of Enoch Powell; the National Front also increased its campaigning and attracted increasing numbers 
of recruits from disillusioned members of the Monday Club. Overall, the anti-Market campaign 
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failed, and Britain joined the EEC on 1 January 1973. However, the issue of relevance for this paper is 
discerning why there was mixed opinion concerning the EEC, by analysing some of the reasons 
behind anti-Market sentiment, and how, if at all, it was related to empire.  
A major reason for opposition to Britain’s entry into the EEC was the threat it presented to 
parliamentary sovereignty. The loss of sovereignty was not only a concern for the Conservatives; 
Euroscepticism stretched across the political spectrum. Former Labour minister Tony Benn was a 
strident campaigner against membership, who later argued that ‘The most formal surrender of 
British sovereignty and parliamentary democracy that has ever occurred in our history took place in 
January 1972, when Mr Heath signed the Treaty of Accession which bound Britain to the Treaty of 
Rome.’209 According to a Times article from 1971, sovereignty became ‘the supreme issue for 
Westminster politicians’ following the anti-Market campaigning of Enoch Powell among others, 
however, the preservation of sovereignty had been a controversial issue during Britain’s first 
application to the EEC by Harold Macmillan.210 For example in July 1961, Tory backbencher Anthony 
Fell called Macmillan’s ‘decision to gamble with British sovereignty in Europe, when 650 million 
people of the British Commonwealth depend upon his faith and his leadership’ as the ‘most 
disastrous thing that any Prime Minister has done for many generations past,’ even calling for 
Macmillan’s resignation.211 According to reports from the Guardian, Fell’s statements ‘whipped the 
House from a state of excitement into sheer uproar, punctuated by sharp, shocked Tory protests,’ 
indicating that even in 1961, debates concerning sovereignty and the EEC aroused the passions of 
the Commons.212 While Macmillan’s application to the EEC ultimately failed, doubts over sovereignty 
resurfaced when Heath made another application to the EEC.  
In some cases, doubts over sovereignty resulted in cautiousness rather than overt opposition to 
Market entry. This is exemplified by a pamphlet issued by the Monday Club, tellingly titled: ‘A 
Europe of Nations’.213 The publication was generally in favour of joining the EEC, however the 
language indicates caution, and perhaps even reluctance. For example, it suggested that ‘a 
confederation of independent states in Western Europe’ would be satisfactory, upon the condition 
that it did not become a federation.214 The meaning of this was clear; the Monday Club was happy 
for Britain to cooperate voluntarily with Europe, but it would not allow Britain to be governed by a 
higher authority, meaning a supranational body, which compromised parliamentary sovereignty. 
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With that said, it was recognised that joining Europe would prevent an erosion of British sovereignty 
to the USA. The US held significant influence over British finance, and the technology it had access 
to; the Monday Club therefore argued that cooperation with Europe would reclaim some of that 
power back from America.215 A similar argument was articulated in a Club pamphlet authored by 
David Levy, a young Tory radical and literary editor of the Monday World journal/newspaper; he 
argued: ‘every day we abstain from the making of multinational Europe our real independence is 
whittled away. Cooperation with our European equals is surely closer to self-government than is our 
present slide into the economic slavery of American domination.’216 This, again, indicates a 
preference for a confederal Europe when compared to the alternative of British subjugation by the 
USA, suggesting that it was viewed as the best of a bad choice. It was perhaps naïve to assume that a 
Europe of sovereign nations, tied together only by voluntary cooperation, would be able to act as a 
coherent bloc that could counter the power of the USA and the USSR. However, for many, 
maintaining British sovereignty and independence to act in its national interest was non-negotiable; 
for some, this meant complete opposition to EEC membership, while for others it meant cautious 
support for membership of the EEC in order to protect Britain from undue American influence.  
Another important reason for opposition to British entry into the EEC was belief in the 
Commonwealth. As with sovereignty, concern for the Commonwealth did not necessarily equate to 
overt opposition to the EEC. For example, in 1962 the Monday Club circulated a memorandum 
highlighting the economic advantages of the EEC, however, it also asserted that any agreement with 
Europe would be inadequate if suitable permanent guarantees were not obtained for 
Commonwealth nations.217 In this case, the Monday Club’s anxiousness to maintain Commonwealth 
ties did not constitute a barrier to joining Europe, but rather a preliminary hurdle. However, for 
others, the Commonwealth was regarded as a better grouping for Britain than the EEC. This 
perspective did not necessarily present the Commonwealth as a more practical alternative to Europe 
for achieving the goal of belonging to a strong power bloc that could compete with, or at least resist 
being influenced by, the two superpowers. Rather, Victor Montagu, executive member of the 
Monday Club, argued that Britain did not need Europe because it did not need to belong to a unified 
power bloc. He wrote: ‘My opposition to the Common Market link up is based on a rejection of the 
power bloc theory as a means of Britain’s survival and a conviction that the Commonwealth, now 
that full independence has been granted, is ready for measures to be devised to give it fresh 
cohesiveness.’218 Montagu believed that Commonwealth ties could be strengthened, primarily 
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through trade, allowing Britain to maintain independence from the US and Europe, while continuing 
to associate with countries with which it had a historical connection.  
For Montagu as well as many others, the historical connection was fundamental to the attraction of 
the Commonwealth over Europe. It allowed continuity to be written into British history, which 
perpetuated the sense that Britain had a national purpose or destiny. A. K. Chesterton referred to 
this continuity of purpose, in a booklet titled Common Market Suicide, as ‘the spirit of the British 
nation – a spirit tempered by a millennium of historical endeavour.’219 For Montagu, the purpose 
that characterised the ‘spirit’ described by Chesterton was ‘world unity’, which he believed that 
Britain could orchestrate because it had spread ‘language, parliamentary institutions and 
commercial practices’ across ‘a vast association of nations which straddles six continents and seven 
seas.’220 Tyndall also appealed to a historical connection with the Commonwealth, although only the 
white Commonwealth, in his vision for Greater Britain. However, Tyndall, unlike Montagu, did 
believe in the power bloc theory, and he saw Greater Britain as a much more unified entity than 
Montagu that would rival the strength of the world’s superpowers. Tyndall proposed ‘an equal 
partnership coordinated by a federal body with powers in certain limited fields… a genuine system of 
political and economic union.’221 While Tyndall did not articulate the specifics of how such a union 
would work, the basic features appear to resemble those of the EEC. For Tyndall, therefore, his 
rejection of the EEC was not based on an objection to its functions or limitations on British 
sovereignty, rather it was based on a belief that there existed a more suitable grouping which 
utilised Britain’s historical connections that could better fulfil Britain’s foreign policy objectives.  
There were also other reasons that were cited for popular opposition to Britain joining the EEC. 
According to an article in the Sunday Times from May 1971, the fear of a rise in the cost of living was 
‘the main stumbling block for Mr Heath’s campaign to win the country’s approval.’222 In spring 1971, 
popular support for the EEC was limited; an article from March 1971 cited that only 22 per cent of 
Britons supported the attempt to join the EEC, while 59 per cent opposed it and 19 per cent 
remained uncertain.223 According to the Sunday Times article, over half of those who opposed entry 
said that they would support it if it meant that the cost of living went down, leaving ‘a hard core of 
only 25 per cent still resolutely against joining Europe.’224 This meant that the majority of anti-
Marketeers were primarily concerned about their standard of living. The 25 per cent ‘hard core’ of 
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the population therefore referred to those who were opposed to the EEC for reasons that were 
attached to strong opinions or personal values. This included belief in parliamentary sovereignty and 
Commonwealth ties, but also xenophobia, anti-bureaucracy, nostalgic reactionism (for pounds, 
ounces etc.) and different trading patterns to Europe. It would be impossible to ascertain what 
proportion of politicians and ordinary Britons believed in any given value or principle, and how far 
their beliefs impacted their vision for Britain’s future. However, what this analysis has shown is that, 
across the British Right, there were a variety of justifications for each of the different imaginings of 
Britain’s new world role in this post-colonial era. While there was limited coherency in the anti-
Market campaign, it is clear that the only reason for opposing EEC membership that was explicitly 
connected to empire was a naïve hope for Commonwealth revival. This would suggest that the 
debate concerning British entry into the Common Market only marginally reflected a right-wing 
difficulty in coming to terms with a new post-colonial order. However, a more nuanced 
interpretation requires an understanding of Britain’s self-perception as a great world power, and a 
more in-depth assessment of how far it is accurate to connect Commonwealth support to imperial 
nostalgia. 
The Significance of Empire in British Post-Imperial Policy 
In the immediate post-war era, despite Britain’s weakened financial position and the loss of India 
from the Empire, Britain assumed itself to have an important position in the world. Encouraged by 
the moral authority gained from victory in the Second World War, and its leadership of the vast 
Empire-Commonwealth, Britain still saw itself as a great world power. This was not entirely a 
delusion; there were various indications that Britain was the third-strongest power in the world, 
after the USA and Soviet Russia. For example, in the early 1950s, Britain paid over 40% of the total 
European contribution to NATO defence spending, it was the only atomic power apart from the two 
superpowers, and it produced almost a third of all industrial output in non-Communist Europe.225 
However, Britain was still deeply dependent on the USA for finance and technology, which left her 
politically vulnerable. Decolonisation meant that Britain steadily lost control of strategic interests 
and could no longer command the trade and foreign policy of territories across the globe. Just a few 
decades prior, there was no doubt that Britain could survive alone (backed by her empire), giving her 
full autonomy to act in her own interests, without need to compromise with other nations. Yet by 
1960, this was no longer the case; opinions were mixed over whether Britain could still survive ‘on 
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her own’ on the basis of its old historical connections, or whether it was time to make concessions to 
European states.226  
With that said, it is important not to project those opinions as clear opposites; one should not 
conflate pro-Europeanism with anti-imperialism. Given that Britain’s decision to accelerate the 
decolonisation of Africa coincided with Macmillan’s application to join the Common Market, the 
application ‘appears irresistibly as an historic watershed in British world policy, marking the moment 
of decisive choice between the global ambitions and imperial commitments of the past and a future 
as a member nation of a united Europe with its supranational ideas.’227 However, it is unlikely that 
Macmillan’s government viewed its decision in that way; it is more probable that it was seen simply 
as a means of preventing British isolation in Europe, rather than as an abandonment of the Empire-
Commonwealth. For many, there was no choice to be made between the Empire-Commonwealth 
and Europe, because they were not mutually exclusive. A pamphlet issued by the Monday Club in 
1965 argued that Britain should maintain strong relations with both groupings. It argued that the 
two groupings were too different to be treated as comparable alternatives to one another: ‘On the 
one hand, Europe is a geographical and cultural entity with an economic, military and political 
potential comparable to any of the great continental powers. The Commonwealth, on the other 
hand, covers a variety of relationships so diverse that it is straining at language to group them under 
one word.’228 From this perspective, Britain did not need to choose between the Empire and Europe; 
at most, it needed to prioritise its commitment to each. This did not seem unfeasible, given that 
other countries in the Commonwealth were also making regional agreements, for example the 
ANZUS pact, while continuing to participate in the Commonwealth. Being pro-European, therefore, 
did not mean being anti-imperialist, and neither was being pro-Commonwealth the same as being 
anti-European or anti-internationalist. Significantly for this paper, being pro-Commonwealth did not 
signify any fundamental rejection of the new, internationalist world order. 
Between 1960 and 1973, after all the debate that has been reviewed in this chapter was exhausted, 
Britain did indeed shift its priorities from the Empire to Europe. This shift was perhaps inevitably 
incoherent and contested, given the longevity of the Empire and the novelty of Britain’s weakened 
position in a changing world. However, the political decisions that led to the gradual abandonment 
of the Commonwealth and the hesitant steps toward Europe were essentially guided by the same 
impulse that had long guided British foreign (and imperial) policy – the protection of Britain’s global 
strategic interests. According to Larry Butler, ‘one of the most important characteristics of the British 
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imperial system’ was its ‘capacity for flexibility and pragmatic adjustment to changing 
circumstances.’229 He argued that British imperial policy was diverse, and often inconsistent, 
however it had a fundamental continuity, which was the safeguarding of British global interests. In 
the 1960s, Britain’s turn towards Europe was essentially an attempt to stabilise Britain’s world 
position. It was a new alliance that would fulfil what Heath understood to be ‘the job of the British 
Government’: ‘to build up British influence in the world.’230 While the Empire, along with Britain’s 
maritime, economic and political power that had been connected to her imperial status, had 
previously given Britain the stature and global influence that it sought, after decolonisation, Britain 
naturally turned to new alliances.  
The turn towards Europe coincided with declining British support for the Commonwealth; yet, as 
argued above, this did not necessarily signify that anti-imperialism was the motivation behind 
Britain’s application to the EEC. To assume otherwise would be to equate declining support for the 
Commonwealth with declining support for the Empire, thereby conflating two different institutions. 
The connections between Empire and Commonwealth are easy to make; one was derived from the 
other, meaning the membership of both groups was largely the same, both institutions had a 
monarch as its figurehead, and during the mid-twentieth century, the British government often used 
to the two terms interchangeably, or even together (‘Empire-Commonwealth’). However, once 
decolonisation was the accepted policy of the British government, and the Commonwealth 
expanded into a new, multi-racial organisation, the Commonwealth had arguably transformed into 
the antithesis of empire. The Empire was concerned with subordination and homogeneity, while the 
Commonwealth celebrated equality and diversity. The Commonwealth was a ‘voluntary organisation 
run by a secretary-general and pledged to promote equality’, unlike the Empire, which was ‘a 
mandatory organisation presided over by a king-emperor and pledged to uphold hierarchy.’231 Of 
course, there were those that believed that the Commonwealth would be a surrogate for empire, 
however, once it became clear that this was not the case, many on the Right lost hope in the 
Commonwealth.  
British Uniqueness and Patriotism 
A factor that was implicit in Britain’s deliberations over a new direction in foreign policy was a 
renegotiation of patriotism. It was briefly examined above in a speech made by Enoch Powell which 
suggested that, with empire in the past, Britain needed to find a new basis of national pride. 
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According to Paxman, stories of struggle, exploration and mission ‘gave the British a deep conviction 
about their national destiny.’232 Empire was what set Britain apart from other nations; it was both 
source and proof of British power. However, Porter argues that while other countries defined Britain 
by her empire, Britain was projecting a different image domestically. He argues that Britain’s self-
image was that of ‘a free, moderate, and peaceful nation, marked off from other nations by those 
qualities, and by the domestic ‘progress’ that had formed the main motif of her history for 400 
years.’233 Porter’s argument better explains the lack of explicit resistance to decolonisation in Britain. 
However, both Paxman and Porter link British pride to that which set Britain apart from other 
nations. British pride was fundamentally linked to its sense of uniqueness, and its ability to act 
independently of any other nation according to its own interests and moral judgements. Britain’s 
ability to act in this way had of course been derived from its economic, political and military 
strength, which in turn were products of the Empire. However, by the early 1960s, empire was lost, 
Britain was weak, and it was dependent on the USA; foreign policy debates in the 1960s therefore 
indicated a desire to regain the strength necessary to act independently in her own interests.  
It was unclear, however, how best to achieve this; Britain seemed to have no direction or purpose 
when it came to foreign policy. Its policy on Africa was inconsistent; while Britain was on the retreat 
from Africa, it continued to interfere in countries with white settler communities, although not 
necessarily in their favour. Britain was becoming a puppet of the USA; when interests clashed, 
Britain made compromises. Policy towards ex-colonial nations was unclear; should Britain seek good 
relations with new African leaders to maintain trade, or fight back against their anti-colonial critique 
at the United Nations? This incoherence suggests that Britain had difficulty adjusting its foreign 
policy to a post-colonial world, in a way that would guarantee the protection of her interests, in 
addition to her sovereignty.   
The range of conflicted opinions over British foreign policy examined in this chapter make a 
conclusive judgement on the relevance of empire difficult. Pro-Commonwealth sentiment was 
sometimes driven by imperial nostalgia, but there were other causes such as experience of 
Commonwealth voluntary cooperation, and historical trade connections that were also significant.  
Pro-EEC sentiment was, for some, a turn away from Britain’s imperial past, however, for others it 
was simply the most practical option for pursuing Britain’s interests, rather than an abandonment of 
the Commonwealth. Some conclusions can, however, be drawn. Firstly, there was clear evidence up 
to the early 1960s of a romantic view of both the Empire and Commonwealth, that caused many to 
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believe that a vastly diverse group of states could voluntarily be held together by their historical 
connection. It was propped up by a false conviction in the emotional commitment of 
Commonwealth countries to Britain. The delayed realisation in the 1960s that Commonwealth 
nations had varied trade and diplomatic interests and were unafraid to pursue them, caused 
significant disillusionment on the Right; the prolonged hopes which clung to old ideals had shown 
the difficulty of some to adapt to Britain’s position in this new world order. Secondly, although there 
were few arguments against the EEC connected explicitly to empire, the argument for sovereignty 
was significant. Britain’s ability to act independently was something it was proud of, and it was 
linked to a belief in British uniqueness and power. These beliefs were derived indirectly from empire, 
and they were fundamental to guiding Britain’s foreign policy, whether Britain now had an empire or 
not. Here we see the common thread between Commonwealth and EEC advocates; both groups 
sought to restore British strength, independence and influence, which were phenomena that Britain 
was accustomed to, due to her imperial past. The disagreements came from how best to realistically 
achieve this goal however the fundamental aim remained the same.  
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Conclusion 
Overall, this paper has explored three distinct issues – the welfare of white settler communities, race 
and immigration, and foreign policy – which showed the different ways in which resistance to the 
new post-colonial world was articulated between 1960-1973. The extent of that resistance or 
difficulty to adjust varied according to the issue being grappled with. Concern for white settler 
communities was largely confined to right-wing politicians and activists, while foreign policy 
proposals which hinted at an underlying imperialism came from both wings of the political spectrum. 
Opposition to immigration had the most popular support, mobilising a much larger section of society 
than the other two issues discussed; here was the strongest evidence that right-wing activity which 
resisted Britain’s process of becoming post-colonial reflected a wider inability to come to terms with 
decolonisation. Generally, however, the most explicitly-imperial sentiment was expressed by the 
Right.  
Few, even on the far right, expressed outward regret over the loss of empire due of the loss of 
tangible assets such as territory or trade. There was some concern that Britain had lost military 
control over geo-strategic interests due to the loss of empire, however the reclaiming of dependent 
territories was rarely proposed as a solution to regaining global influence. Rather, evidence suggests 
that British resistance to the post-colonial order was based on an emotional commitment to strands 
of imperialism, rather than a will to reclaim what was lost. For example, protection of white settler 
interests was tied to a sense of loyalty towards ‘kith and kin’, and duty towards Africans, to prevent 
them from descending into the chaos that would ensue if they were left without British guidance. 
Hopes for the Commonwealth indicated a belief in Britain’s moral authority to lead her former 
colonies, together with a conviction that the Empire had not been held together by coercion, but by 
common values and, in some cases, common blood. Attitudes towards race were more complex; 
mainstream political leaders held on to traditionally professed values of British tolerance and multi-
racialism, while the reality of the white superiority that underpinned empire was reflected in the 
anti-immigration activism that came from below. Here, it was those that pushed for measures such 
as the Race Relations Acts that remained committed to the outward display of moral behaviour, 
which had been so crucial to legitimising empire.  
It is important not to overstate the conclusions made in this study. It would be an exaggeration to 
argue that Britain remained a fully imperial society, or that British politics was at its core governed 
by a sense of imperial mission. This paper has given various examples of Tory MPs and even 
ministers who betrayed imperialist beliefs and motivations, however they often stepped away from 
party line to do so. The Conservative Party leadership was consistently more left-leaning than the 
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bulk of the party, and it would be difficult to argue that Prime Ministers Macmillan or Heath were 
governed by any sense of imperial mission. Significantly, this can explain why most scholarship to 
date has failed to acknowledge the extent of the Right’s resistance to the loss of empire. The far 
right, meaning groups such as the National Front, the Greater Britain Movement and the League of 
Empire Loyalists, were more explicitly imperialist than the Conservative Party, but even then, one 
must be careful not to draw simplistic conclusions. An ‘imperialist’ mentality consisted of several, 
sometimes conflicting, ideas such as paternalism, racism and liberalism; someone such as Tyndall, 
who believed in the superiority of the British race, but not in any sense of duty towards ‘inferior’ 
races, thus resists simple categorisation as an imperialist. It is better therefore to understand this 
study as uncovering traces of imperialism that persisted in British politics as Britain sought to make 
the transition towards becoming post-colonial.  
This study has shown that, contrary to conventional historical wisdom, Britain was far from 
indifferent towards the dismantling of empire. The historiography to date has largely taken the 
dismantling of empire to literally mean the loss of colonial territories. However, this paper has 
examined how sentimental attitudes towards Britain’s imperial past manifested as tensions and 
disagreements when Britain was confronted with phenomena such as Commonwealth immigration 
and political advance in Central Africa. This constituted resistance to the post-colonial order in a way 
that was more complex than simply rejecting the process of losing overseas territories. By examining 
the extent and articulation of Britain’s emotional commitment to empire, this paper has opened up 
a new angle for historical analysis of how decolonisation was received in Britain.  
It has been shown how elements of right-wing ideas often bled into the political and popular 
mainstream, however this paper does not claim to prove that imperialist ideas underlay the 
thoughts of the majority, or that most people struggled to adjust to a post-colonial order. Given that 
this study focuses on the right wing of British politics, it is too one-sided to make such a claim. A 
future study seeking to measure the extent of such ideas would need to look at the opposite end of 
the spectrum for comparison; it would need to explore the pervasion of ideas and rhetoric used by 
the anti-colonial movement, or British perception of post-colonial, or internationalist movements. A 
wider study of public media would also be fruitful; this study has been limited largely to the use of 
national newspapers, however a deeper analysis could look not only at regional newspapers, but 
also compare the popular reception of films such as Passage to India and Gandhi, or look at the 
influence of reggae, soul and grime music. By combining traditional historical methods with literary 
analysis techniques, one could better ascertain how far the views of the far right were shared by the 
wider population. This paper has simply opened up the extent of imperial influences on the wider 
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population to speculation; it has been shown that ideas and rhetoric derived from empire continued 
to be used by mainstream politicians, but the extent of their influence has yet to be shown. 
Overall, it is clear that the Right had difficulty adjusting to a Britain without empire. Right-wing 
politics remained saturated with the residue of empire, as shown by the persistence of paternalism, 
racism, and the image of Britain as a major world power, deserving of global influence. The difficulty 
to adjust was often articulated as disagreements. For example, conflicts within the Conservative 
Party showed how the will to preserve imperial interests came up against the more progressive will 
of the leadership, often resulting in public divisions. In the case of defending white settlers, 
disagreements indicated that there was a vocal group that actively sought to maintain certain 
imperial assets under British control. However, conflicting proposals over British foreign policy did 
not necessarily indicate a will to maintain empire, rather it reflected Britain’s difficulty to adjust to a 
world where its empire did not guarantee it a strong voice in world affairs. This does not detract 
from the traditional argument that the British Right, particularly the Conservative Party as the party 
of empire, adjusted relatively well to the loss of empire given the speed of the decolonisation 
process. However, this study has acknowledged the difficulties of that transition, highlighting that, 
despite the progressive leadership of the Tories, imperialist impulses and ideas continued to guide 
the actions of not only the Right but also wider society as Britain transitioned into a post-imperial 
nation.   
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